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TIMING MATTERS: PROMOTING FORUM
SHOPPING BY INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS
Robert K Rasmussen* & Randall S. Thomas-
INTRODUCTION
Timing is everything. We all know people who, when making similar
choices at different points in their lives, have made different decisions each
time. A young man who chose to pursue professional advancement, even
though it took him away from his family, may when he is older choose to
spend more time with his family instead of seeking another promotion.
Similar situations occur in legal settings. This is not irrational conduct:
even economic decision makers, acting in a calculating self-interested man-
ner,I care about timing.
Law and economics scholars explain that timing matters because the
incentives that actors face change over time. These variations in context
explain what might otherwise appear as logical anomalies. For example,
corporate law scholars claim that corporate charter provisions drafted at the
time of incorporation tend to be efficient, yet if those same provisions are
offered as amendments to a pre-existing charter, these scholars argue that
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I This is the standard assumption of traditional economic analysis. A growing literature enriches this
assumption by delineating the ways in which actual decisionmaking deviates from this ideal. See, e.g.,
Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (1998); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). These deviations are, in some situations, counteracted through structural
mechanisms. See, eg., Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bank-
nrptcy Lav, and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1687-1702 (1998) (explaining mecha-
nisms in banks designed to increase the rationality of lending decisions).
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they are wealth decreasing.2 In a similar vein, many courts and commenta-
tors decry forum shopping.3 At the same time, however, they applaud the
use of forum selection clauses.4
The common explanation for these apparent contradictions is that the
parties' incentives were different at the earlier point of time than they were
later on. Thus, in both the charter and forum-selection situations, what
changes is not the decision to be made-in the former it is the terms of the
charter, in the latter it is where a dispute will be litigated-but rather the in-
centives the actor faces when the decision is made. Initial corporate charter
provisions will be tested in the market in a way in which midstream
amendments will not. Similarly, parties agree to forum selection clauses at
the time of contract formation, when they are attempting to maximize the
contract surplus, as opposed to the litigation setting, where one party is at-
tempting to gain an advantage over the other party.
This insight-that timing matters-can be applied to analyze corporate
bankruptcy reform initiatives. In this article, we demonstrate that timing is
2 Compare FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991) (arguing that initial charter terms tend to be efficient) with Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter
Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1822-29 (1989) (midterm charter amendments should be lim-
ited); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Lav: An Essay on the Judicial
Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1674-78 (1989) (similar); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1443-44 (1989) (similar).
3 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Schultz v. Boy Scouts
of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 686-87 (N.Y. 1985); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising
the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507 (1995); Henry H. Friendly, Averting the Flood by
Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 634, 641 (1974); Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a
Venue: The Needfor More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 267 (1996).
4 See, eg., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590-95 (1991); The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Linda Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law:
Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988); Michael E.
Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 51 (1992).
5 For example, several economically-oriented bankruptcy scholars have argued that firms should be
allowed to select their own bankruptcy regime, so long as such selection is done prior to the onset of fi-
nancial distress. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1997); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Reorgani-
zation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 51 (1992) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice]; Alan Schwartz, A Contract
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998) [hereinafter Schwartz, Contract The-
ory Approach]; Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997) [herein-
after Schwartz, Contracting]; see also Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) (arguing that current bankruptcy law should be re-
placed by a regime that enforces contractual priority). Just as in the corporate chartering and forum shop-
ping examples above, they claim that the time at which the decision is made has efficiency implications,
Initial charter provisions, or contractual clauses, are value enhancing, whereas the same choices made When
insolvency looms imminent are not.
However, our proposals in this article, while directed toward increasing the efficiency of the bankruptcy
law and applying a law and economics methodology, are quite distinct from the earlier literature. Unlike
the proposed bankruptcy law reforms discussed above, our proposal could be implemented within the ex-
isting legal system with little or no change to current legal rules. Such an incremental approach to law re-
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the key to unraveling the controversy surrounding one of the most hotly con-
tested aspects of current bankruptcy law, forum shopping by corporations
seeking to reorganize under Chapter 11. Examining this problem in light of
the incentives that the relevant actors face reveals two novel propositions.
First, we argue that, despite the widespread criticisms of forum shop-
ping, the Bankruptcy Code would be more efficient if the law were to fa-
cilitate more forum shopping by companies for bankruptcy venue. Such
legal reform is warranted by the importance of timing and the different in-
centives corporate managers face at different times. If the law were to al-
low companies to commit to a particular bankruptcy venue prior to the
onset of financial distress, managers would have strong incentives to select
the forum that would maximize the value of the firm.6 We would forbid
subsequent unilateral changes of this choice of forum, particularly if the
firm becomes insolvent, because managers' interests are likely to diverge
from those of the firm as a whole at that time.
Second, we contend that such a shift will do more than ensure that
bankruptcy cases are handled by the jurisdiction which best promotes firm
value; it will actually provide incentives for bankruptcy judges to increase
their efficiency in handling Chapter 11 cases in order to attract these cases.
Bankruptcy court judges seem to derive significant nonpecuniary benefits
from handling these high profile, newsworthy cases. To the extent that
these rewards lead bankruptcy judges to compete for cases, as they seem to
do now, our proposal will lead them to seek to devise more efficient meth-
ods of resolving them.
form has the virtue of not requiring wholesale legislative action and the attendant uncertainties that usu-
ally accompany such changes. See, e.g., Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bank-
ruptcy: Theoretical Analysis and Practical Guidance, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 159 (1998) (proposing
implementing an auction system for bankrupt companies through slight modifications in application of
existing bankruptcy rules). This increases the likelihood that our proposal will be legislatively enacted.
6 As we explain more fully below, we would allow managers to insert such a forum selection clause
into the company's certificate of incorporation at the request of the company's creditors, without share-
holder approval, even as the company approaches insolvency, in order to maximize the value of the
firm. However, once such a forum is selected, this choice could not be changed by the firm's manage-
ment without the creditors' consent. We argue that this provision will make the choice of bankruptcy
forum more salient to the firm's financial investors and sharpen managers' and creditors' incentives to
use it as a method of maximizing firm value. See infra Part III.C.
7 Our proposal to permit companies to preselect a bankruptcy forum has many of the same virtues
that forum selection and choice of law provisions have in contractual settings. As other scholars have
noted, if the parties to a contract are allowed to preselect the forum in which they will litigate any po-
tential disputes and the applicable law, they can insure that the most efficient forum and legal rules will
be applied. See Michael Klausner, A Comment on Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in THE FALL
AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 349 (Francis H. Buckley ed., 1999); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry
E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT,
supra, at 325. Conversely, the existing system of bankruptcy venue selection suffers from the same in-
firmities that arise in ex post litigation contexts, where the parties choose the venue most likely to
mximize their individual gain, irrespective of its impact on their joint welfare. See Harold G. Maier &
Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L.
249,266-67 (1991).
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We develop our arguments concerning these points as follows. Part I
begins in subpart A with a discussion of the practice of forum shopping for
bankruptcy venue under the current Bankruptcy Code. The Code generally
provides a firm seeking to reorganize under Chapter 11 with a number of
permissible filing venues. Firms filing for bankruptcy, especially large
firms represented by high-quality counsel, choose to file in the venue that
best promotes their interests as debtors. Most large Chapter 11 cases are
not commenced in the judicial district where the firm's corporate head-
quarters is located.8 Rather, firms take advantage of the Bankruptcy Code's
venue provisions to file in debtor-friendly jurisdictions, frequently thou-
sands of miles away. In short, forum shopping is rampant.
We next trace the evolution of venue choices over time. During the
first decade after the passage of the Bankruptcy Code, publicly traded com-
panies filing for Chapter 11 tended to steer their cases to the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.9 In the second decade after the Code's enactment,
however, there has been a dramatic shift in filing patterns so that the Dela-
ware bankruptcy courts have become the venue of choice.'0
In Part B, we explain how these bankruptcy venue patterns developed.
This history shows that large, publicly held corporations have engaged in
strategic bankruptcy venue selection. Moreover, debtors appear to be en-
gaged in judge shopping 2 within their preferred venues. While a few
commentators endorse forum shopping in limited circumstances, 3 none
condones judge shopping. Thus, the widespread speculation that case as-
signments were not random in the Southern District of New York during its
peak years as the preferred venue for debtors added fuel to the furor over
companies' choices to file there.'
4
A similar complaint has been made about Delaware. In the early
1990s, firms deciding to file there knew which judge would hear their case
because Delaware only had one bankruptcy judge. Now Delaware has two
8 See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of
Venue Choice in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 967 (1999).
9 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 26-29.
10 GORDON BERMANT ET AL., CHAPTER 11 VENUE CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES 38-42
(Federal Judicial Center ed., 1997).
1 See infra text accompanying notes 38-49.
12 By judge shopping, we mean the practice of attempting to select a particular judge as opposed to
just a particular forum. See Norwood, supra note 3, at 292-99.
13 See, eg., Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV.
553 (1989); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677 (1990). Much of this de-
bate has been clouded by a lack of consensus on what constitutes forum shopping and how much forum
shopping actually occurs. See Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1998) (trying to ascertain the level of forum shopping).
14 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8, at 983-84.
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judges.'5 But this judicial expansion did not eliminate the problem because
these judges shared similar views, 16 and debtors could call the chief judge
before filing their case to learn which of the two bankruptcy judges would
handle it.
17
Subpart C of Part I examines the recent criticisms of bankruptcy venue.
Widespread concerns over the practice of choosing to file in Delaware led
the Federal Judicial Center to commission a study of the "problem,"'18 the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission to propose an amendment that
would narrow the venue provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 19 and the Dis-
trict Court of Delaware to remove from the Delaware Bankruptcy Court the
authority to hear all Chapter 11 cases automatically. 0
We begin our analysis of these events by showing that not all critics are
motivated by concerns for the virtues of the rule of law. Rather, an examina-
tion of the complaints offered, and the identity of those who offered them, re-
veals that many complaints are generated by a baser motive: greed. In the
legal market today, widespread competition exists for clients and the attor-
neys' fees they generate. Chapter 11 cases generate millions of dollars in
fees, and thus bankruptcy lawyers compete to handle these cases.21 While
attorneys from outside the district where the bankruptcy petition is filed can,
and often do, represent parties in a bankruptcy proceeding, parties often retain
local counsel.22 Thus, when a large firm files a bankruptcy petition in a cer-
tain district, this filing directly increases the wealth of the bankruptcy attor-
neys who practice in that district. Given this rule, it is not surprising that
many of the vocal opponents of the shift toward Delaware have been bank-
ruptcy attorneys in states other than Delaware,2 and that the most strident de-
15 See Ann Davis, Too Much Bustle in Bankruptcy Court?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1997, at BI (ex-
plaining that Judge Balick was the only bankruptcy judge in Delaware until the 1993 appointment of
Judge Walsh, who, until his appointment, was a member of the Delaware bankruptcy bar).
16 See Mark D. Collins, Why Delaware?, 15 DEL. LAN'. 38,40 (Fall 1997).
17 See BERMANT ET AL., supra note 10, at 40-41.
Is See id. at 7 (report stemmed from request of Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy
System in June 1996).
19 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION 770-87 (October 20, 1997)
[hereinafter NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REPORT].
20 See James Agger, Delaware Bankruptcy Order Unsettles Local Practitioners, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER 1 (Jan. 28, 1997); Delaware District Court Withdraws Reference of All Ch. II Cases to
Bankruptcy Court, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH), at 123 (Jan. 30, 1997).
21 See, e.g., Alexander L. Paskay & Frances Pilaro Wolstenhome, Chapter 11: A Growing Cash
Cow, Some Thoughts on How to Rein in the System, I AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331 (1993); Lawrence
A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
285, 285-89 (1990).
22 Indeed, the local rules of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court require the retention of attorneys li-
censed by the Delaware Supreme Court. See BANKR. D. DEL. R. 23.
23 See, e-g., Delaware's Withdrawal of the Reference: What It Means, 30 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR)
No. 4 (Feb. 11, 1997) ("You will recall that, for at least the past five years, much of the bankruptcy
bench and bar (outside of Delaware and possibly New York) has been complaining about the fact that
many large corporations file Chapter 11 in the District of Delaware .... ); William B. Sullivan, Shaking
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fense of the current venue provisions has been issued by the Delaware Bar
Association.24 A similar alignment has occurred in Congress, with legisla-
tors from outside of Delaware supporting an anti-Delaware amendment to
the Code, and those from Delaware trying to block such a change
Yet there is more substance to the current debate than just a squabble
over money. After all, many of the participants are not bankruptcy attor-
neys; they include various scholars and those charged with reforming ex-25 r
isting law. Moreover, despite the apparent pecuniary interests of those
objecting to current practice, the evils that they identify-forum shopping
and judge shopping-have been the subject of concern well beyond the
domain of bankruptcy law. It is one thing to show that a particular argu-
ment is motivated by economic interests; it is quite another thing to show
that the argument is fallacious.
In Part II, we set the stage for our theoretical analysis of forum shop-
ping by reviewing the arguments made in the "race to the top" corporate
law scholarship. This literature argues that public companies incorporate in
Delaware for efficiency reasons. 26 It claims that Delaware, through its reli-
ance on charter revenue and its judicial selection process, has committed it-
self to provide corporate laws that enhance firm performance, and that
market forces lead firms to adopt these value-enhancing laws.27 The linch-
pin of the "race to the top" argument is that managers select their firm's state
of incorporation before they enter the capital markets. If managers select a
state of incorporation with inefficient legal rules, the firm pays a higher cost
for capital. The threat of this higher cost creates an incentive for the firm's
managers to select a jurisdiction that maximizes firm value.
Part III extends this argument to the bankruptcy context. We first ex-
amine the incentives that managers face to show that current law generates
efficient venue choice for less contentious, voluntarily agreed to, prepack-
the Jurisdictional System; Will Revocation of Automatic Reference Become the Norm?, 14 BANKR.
STRATEGIST 1, 6 (March 1997) ("most lawyers, accountants and other bankruptcy professionals located
in other states look upon Delaware's loss as their gain"); Ann Davis, Delaware Bankruptcy Lawyers to
Meet with Judges on Overhaul of Procedures, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1997, at B8 ("[l]awycrs and judges
from other states have complained about Delaware's dominance").
24 See Report of the Delaware State Bar Association to the National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion in Support of Maintaining Existing Venue Choices (Oct. 3, 1996), reprinted in NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY REPORT, supra note 19, at App. D-3; see also Davis, supra note 23 ("Delaware lawyers
have fought fiercely against the proposal.").
25 See, eg.. Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8; David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bank-
ruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1 (1998); NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
REPORT, supra note 19, at 770-87.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 129-40. David Skeel, drawing on this same literature, has ar-
gued that bankruptcy law should be returned to the states. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line
Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994). We do not address
the merits of Skeel's proposal in this article because, as we mention below, we restrict our focus here to
reforms that can be implemented within the extant bankruptcy system.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 129-40.
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aged bankruptcies. At the same time, managerial incentives in the case of a
more traditional Chapter 11 diverge from the interests of the firm as a
whole. Changing the law to allow venue choice before the firm becomes
financially distressed would encourage managers to choose bankruptcy
venues that enhance firm value in both situations. Our argument is that the
firm's managers select the venue that best promotes their own interests.
These interests, and the extent to which they are aligned with those of the
firm as a whole, will vary over time. Under current law, managers need not
decide on the filing venue until after the firm has become financially dis-
tressed. By this point, the interests of the managers often diverge from the
interests of the firm as a whole.28 Were the law amended to allow a firm's
managers to bind the firm to filing in a particular venue, and were such
commitment made before the firm entered the capital markets, then the
managers would have an incentive to select the venue that promised to
maximize the value of the firm as a whole.
Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, we maintain that forum shop-
ping, and even judge shopping, can increase the efficiency of the Bankruptcy
Code. To this end, the current proposals for restricting venue choice are mis-
guided; if anything, venue choices should be increased, subject to one crucial
change-the time at which the venue decision is to be made. Firms should
be allowed to make a venue choice before they enter the capital markets.
We believe that such a shift will also lead to competition among juris-
dictions that will provide an incentive to bankruptcy judges to increase their
efficiency in handling Chapter 11 cases. To expand on this point, we first
note that judges appear to compete to attract the big, high profile Chapter
11 cases, perhaps to raise their status with their peers, or perhaps because
they prefer the intellectual challenges of the complex corporate cases. The
Bankruptcy Code grants these judges substantial discretion in administering29
bankruptcy cases. As we noted above, firms to date have tended to file in
"debtor friendly" courts-courts that routinely exercised their discretion in
ways that benefited debtors at the expense of creditors. If our proposal
were implemented, thereby allowing debtors to make venue choices prior to
the onset of financial distress, debtors would have an incentive to select a
judge who will exercise her discretion in the most "efficiency enhancing"
manner. This incentive arises because our proposal enables creditors to dif-
ferentiate among debtors based on the jurisdiction in which they have
committed to file.
28 See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439 (1992); Douglas
G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
97, 101-09 (1984); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment In-
centives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy
and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991).
29 See infra note 68.
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We recognize that legal reform proposals based on economic insights
face formidable obstacles. On the one hand, they have the virtue of con-
ceptual purity and intellectual rigor.30 On the other hand, they often pro-
pose a complete rejection of extant law, and endorse wholesale departures
from current practices. While there are benefits to rebuilding the law on
solid foundations, lawmakers are normally reluctant to do so unless disaster
strikes.32 We believe that our proposal to restrict bankruptcy venue selec-
tions to those made when the firm seeks capital in the market, but prior to
financial insolvency, has the virtue of being analytically sound and yet ca-
pable of implementation without radical legal reform.
I. THE RACE TO DELAWARE FOR CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
Forum shopping and judge shopping are hotly contested practices.33
Until recently, little attention has been paid to these problems in the area of
corporate reorganization. 4 Recent events, however, have focused national
attention on the question of where large, publicly held firms file for bank-
ruptcy.
A. Evidence of Forum (and Maybe Judge) Shopping
The Bankruptcy Code provides a firm seeking to reorganize under
Chapter 11 a broad choice of potential forums. The Code permits the firm
to file its petition in any district where the company has its principal place
of business, its principal assets, or its "domicile," that is, the firm's state of
35incorporation. Moreover, the Code allows a firm to file a petition in any
district in which an "affiliate" of the firm has a pending bankruptcy case.
3 6
The extent to which these venue provisions provide a meaningful
choice to a firm in financial distress will often turn on the size of the firm.
30 See generally Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE LJ. 573 (1998) (com-
paring the premises of law and economics bankruptcy scholars with those of traditional bankruptcy scholars).
31 A notable exception to this deficiency is Barry Adler's work on preference law. See Barry E. Adler,
Accelerated Resolution of Financial Distress, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1169 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Acceler-
ated Resolution]; Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 575 (1995) [hereinafter Adler, Re-Examination]; see also Hansen & Thomas, supra note 5
(proposing that existing Chapter 11 rules be enforced to implement an alternative Chapter 1 regime in
which companies are auctioned if they fail to reorganize within 180 days).
32 For example, Congress passed the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Exchange Act in the after-
math of the 1929 collapse in the stock market and ensuing chaos and economic hardship that resulted.
33 A good summary can be found in Solimine, supra note 13, at 18-21.
34 The first academic article on this subject was LoPucki and Whitford's 1991 article. LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 9. The current debate over the validity of Delaware as an appropriate forum has
generated articles by Eisenberg and LoPucki and Skeel. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8; Skeel,
supra note 25.
35 28 U.S.C. 1408(1) (1994). See In re Ocean Properties of Del., Inc., 95 B.R. 304 (Bankr. D, Del.
1988) (holding that state of incorporation is a corporation's residence for purposes of bankruptcy venue).
36 28 U.S.C. 1408(2) (1994).
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Many smaller firms will have only one venue choice; it is often the case
that a firm, which has no affiliates, is incorporated, has its principal place of
business, and has its principal assets all located in the same district. Many,
if not most, small, privately held firms fit this description.
Large, publicly held firms, on the other hand, will generally have more
viable bankruptcy venue choices. These firms are more likely to incorpo-
rate in a state other than the one where their headquarters or principal assets
are located.37 Their headquarters may well be in a different jurisdiction
than their principal assets. They are also more likely to have affiliates in
other jurisdictions, thereby expanding their range of permissible venues. 38
Large, publicly held firms thus normally have a choice over the jurisdiction
in which they file a Chapter 11 petition.
Increasingly, critics have scrutinized large, publicly held firms' choices
among these potential venues. This forum shopping phenomenon first at-
tracted attention during the 1980s, when a number of large, publicly held
firms filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. Even a
casual observer could not help but note that many of these firms had little
contact with New York. Indeed, during this period, the list of firms filing in
the Southern District read like the "Who's Who" of major 1980s' reorgani-
zations-Johns Manville, Texaco, LTV, and Eastern Airlines.
Eastern Airlines' Chapter 11 filing was the most visible example of
venue shopping. Eastern, a Miami-based corporation, was able to steer its
reorganization case to the Southern District by having its wholly owned
subsidiary-Ionsphere Clubs (which ran Eastern's hospitality suites for its
frequent fliers)-file for bankruptcy in the Southern District.39 Ionsphere
Clubs represented only a tiny fraction of Eastern's assets, and was solvent
when it filed for bankruptcy.40 Six minutes after the financially sound Ion-
sphere Clubs filed for bankruptcy, Eastern filed its own petition in the
Southern District, piggybacking on the petition filed by its one hundred
percent owned subsidiary.41 While Eastern's filing was perhaps the most
egregious example of forum shopping, most of the other major corporate
reorganization filings were based on similarly slight connections with the
Southern District of New York.
37 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 6 (American Enterprise
Institute ed., 1993) (approximately one half of the largest industrial firms are incorporated in Delaware);
see also Robert Daines, State Competition in Corporate Law, draft (reporting that corporations that in-
corporate in a jurisdiction other than the one in which they are based tend to incorporate overwhelm-
ingly in Delaware).
38 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 21 (reporting that of firms that they studied, roughly
three fourths were composed of between 3 and 26 entities).
39 Ionsphere Club was considered an affiliate of Eastern for purposes of the Code. See I I U.S.C. §
101(2) (1994). No one asserted that the Southem District of New York was an improper venue for Ion-
sphere Club.
40 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 22.
41 See id.
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These high visibility filings raised eyebrows because debtors were per-
ceived as receiving highly deferential treatment by the bankruptcy court han-
dling them. Moreover, it appeared to many commentators that a single judge
handled a disproportionate number of these controversial cases.42 For exam-
ple, many commentators were critical of the Johns Manville Chapter 11 reor-
ganization, which paid contract creditors in full, left equity in the hands of
pre-bankruptcy shareholders, but created an allegedly inadequately funded
trust fund for the victims of asbestos sold by Manville.43 In the LTV filing,
the reorganization process dragged on for over six years. Eastern's reorgani-
zation again provided the most grist for the rumor mill: after selling its prof-
itable air routes to gather more than a billion dollars in cash, the firm was
permitted to spend all of this money in a futile attempt to reorganize over
the repeated objections of its creditors. These cases created a perception that
major firms in financial distress were forum (and possibly judge) shopping. 4
Empirical studies demonstrated that these high visibility cases were
part of a trend. Between 1979 and 1988, the Southern District of New York
captured roughly thirty percent of the reorganizations of large, publicly held
firms.45 This is a surprisingly large number, especially because the South-
ern District of New York would not be a permissible venue for many firms.
For example, Delaware, not New York, is where most Fortune 500 firms
are incorporated. Furthermore, while New York is home to a large number
of corporate headquarters, it has no monopoly on them, and few firms have
their principal assets located in Manhattan. Nevertheless, in the 1980s,
whenever firms had the opportunity to file in the Southern District of New
York, they did SO. 4 6 Once again, debtors appeared to be filing in the South-
ern District because they believed that they would receive better treatment
in its bankruptcy court.
Delaware was not a bankruptcy venue of choice in the 1980s. Only
one large, publicly traded firm filed a bankruptcy petition in Delaware dur-
ing this time period, and that firm had both its corporate headquarters and
most important assets located in Delaware.47 In other words, Delaware was
42 Not only were a number of major cases filed in the Southern District of New York, a substantial
number of them were handled by the same bankruptcy judge, Judge Burton R. Lifland. For example,
Judge Lifland handled the Manville, LTV, and Eastern Airlines cases. From 1980 to 1987, Judge Li-
fland handled over half of the Chapter 11 cases filed in the Southern District involving large, publicly
held companies. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8, at n.47.
43 See KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: How CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS USE
CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE Ch. 3 (1992); Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injury
Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOzo L. REV. 583 (1996); Thomas A. Smith, A Capital
Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367, 368-70 (1994).
44 See Seth Lubove, A Bankrupt's Best Friend, FORBES, Apr. 1, 1991, at 99.45 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 29.
46 LoPucki and Whitford's landmark study of forum shopping in 1980s indicates that firms chose to
file for reorganization in the Southern District when it was an available venue. Id. at 59-63 (listing cases
studied and basis for venue in each).
47 See id. at 62.
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its only potential venue. Of the many other large, publicly held firms that
had the option of filing for bankruptcy in Delaware because they were in-
corporated there, none did so.
The past decade, however, has seen a dramatic reversal in this trend:
large numbers of firms now file for Chapter 11 reorganization in Delaware,
while relatively few seek to do so in the Southern District of New York.
This shift began in 1990, as firms began to view Delaware as a desirable
bankruptcy venue. By 1996, Delaware attracted thirty-one percent of the
publicly traded corporations that filed for Chapter 11. Moreover, these
were very large firms, collectively owning over seventy percent of the as-
sets of the publicly traded companies filing for bankruptcy during that time
period.48 The 1997 and 1998 figures remained high. For both years, of
publicly traded companies filing for bankruptcy, twenty-two percent filed in
Delaware; these firms held a substantial portion of the assets of publicly
traded firms filing for bankruptcy in those years-thirty-two percent (1997)
and twenty-four percent (1998).f 9 The past year saw a dramatic increase in
these figures. In 1999, forty-one percent of publicly traded companies that
filed for bankruptcy chose to file in Delaware. These firms held sixty-nine
percent of the assets of publicly traded firms filing for bankruptcy that
year.50 At the moment, Delaware is clearly the venue of choice for large,
publicly held firms filing for bankruptcy.5
In contrast, in 1996, the Southern District of New York garnered only
eight percent of publicly traded firms filing for bankruptcy. In 1997, that
figure dropped another percentage point. As a result, the Southern District
of New York had declined as a bankruptcy venue to the point where it is
only tied with the Southern District of Florida for the third most frequently
used corporate venue. 2
48 See THE 1997 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 68 (Christopher M. McHugh ed., 7th ed.
1997) [hereinafter 1997 YEARBOOK].
49 See THE 1998 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 68 (Christopher M. McHugh ed., 8th ed.
1998) [hereinafter 1998 YEARBOOK]; THE 1999 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 66 (Christo-
pher M. McHugh ed., 9th ed. 1999) [hereinafter 1999 YEARBOOK].
'o See THE 2000 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 66 (Christopher M. McHugh ed., 10th
ed. 2000) [hereinafter 2000 YEARBOoK].
51 See Chapter 11 Filings Rise-in Delaware! 36 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR) No. 5 (June 27, 2000)
(reporting rise in Delaware filings in second quarter of 2000).
52 The Central District of California had seven publicly held companies file for bankruptcy in that
district in 1997, one more than New York did. The Southern District of Florida also had six publicly
held corporations file in that time period. See 1998 YEARBOOK, supra note 49, at 68. In 1998, the
Southern District had regained second place, attracting 10 cases, which is roughly 8% of the cases filed.
The Central District of California had nine cases, and the Southern District of Florida eight. See 1999
YEARBOOK, supra note 49, at 66. The Southern District of New York remained in second place in 1999
attracting 10% of the filings; the Central District of California and the District of New Jersey tied for
third with 5.5% each. See 2000 YEARBOOK, supra note 50, at 66.
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We turn next to an analysis of the reasons for the initial rise of the
Southern District of New York as a preferred venue and the ensuing shift of
corporate reorganizations to Delaware.
B. The Motivations for Bankruptcy Forum Shopping
Bankruptcy forum shopping patterns are path dependent. The core
idea of path dependence is that past events constrain future possibilities. 53
For example, the decision by IBM to adopt MS-DOS as the operating sys-
tem for its first PC continues to affect the choice of software run on many
computers today. 4 This theory accurately describes the pattern of corporate
bankruptcy forum shopping.
To see why the bankruptcy venue selection process is path dependent,
we must examine the incentives of the relevant actors who decide where
firms file for Chapter 11. State corporate law places the bankruptcy filing
decision in the hands of the board of directors, who normally delegate to the
company's senior management the choice as to when, and in what district,
to file for reorganization. 55 Managers will generally select a jurisdiction
that promotes their self-interest, which is frequently to preserve their posi-
tions within the firm, although how they further these interests may vary
depending on the particular problems facing the firm. Thus, in some situa-
tions, managers' incentives will lead them to act contrary to the interests of
creditors, while in others these two groups' interests may converge.56
Senior management will consult with bankruptcy counsel before initi-
ating the reorganization process. Attorneys advising corporations where to
file bankruptcy proceedings base their advice on their experience in differ-
ent jurisdictions and the other information that they have about the available
fora. A forum with a hospitable reputation for debtors will be recom-
mended over one where it is less certain how the debtor will be treated.
Attorneys will also consider how experienced the particular court is in
handling bankruptcies of large, publicly held corporations. Courts that
handle these cases regularly will gain valuable experience that they would
not obtain from working with other forms of bankruptcy filings. Thus,judges and clerks' offices that have previously handled a large corporate
bankruptcy, may handle new, major Chapter 11 cases more efficiently than
inexperienced ones. If courts gain experience in this way, or at least if
53 For a general discussion of path dependence, and the way in which it may provide insights into
legal issues, see Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics. 109 HARV. L. REv. 641
(1996); Symposium, Path Dependence and Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 317 (1996).
54 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75
AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985).
55 Corporate law generally rests authority in the Board of Directors, who are generally free to de-
volve this authority onto the managers. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 142 (1999).
56 See infra Parts III.A. & III.B.
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bankruptcy attorneys perceive that they do, this would provide another rea-
57
son for path dependency in the forum shopping area.
Bankruptcy attorneys advising firms about where to file their case are
also influenced by their own financial self-interest. These incentives are a
function of how attorneys for the debtor are compensated in Chapter 11.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's attorneys are paid from the firm's
assets, ahead of all prepetition, unsecured creditors.5 8 This payment scheme
creates an agency problem-the managers hire the attorneys, but then have
little incentive to monitor the amount of fees paid by the estate. Instead, the
group that pays these fees is the debtor's unsecured creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code attempts to address this agency problem by re-
quiring the bankruptcy court to review requests by the debtor's attorneys for
fees. Courts differ in their approach to fee applications. These differences
include how closely a court is willing to scrutinize the hours claimed and
the hourly rate that the court is willing to approve. In particular, one im-
portant, recurring issue is whether New York attorneys should be paid at
New York billing rates, or at the (invariably) lower rates which prevail in
any other jurisdiction where the bankruptcy court handling the petition is
located.59 Not surprisingly, bankruptcy attorneys prefer to file in courts that
are more likely to award the fees they request.
Recent developments in Houston highlight the importance of fee awards
to venue decisions. The bankruptcy judges in the Southern District of Texas,
in an attempt to induce local attorneys to file large Chapter 11 cases in their
district, established an advisory committee to produce recommendations on
how the bankruptcy judges should handle Chapter 11 cases.60 The committee
was comprised of local bankruptcy judges and local bankruptcy attorneys. 6
1
Local attorneys complained that the bankruptcy judges were reticent to ap-
prove an hourly rate of above $300 an hour. After receiving the report of
the advisory committee, one of the local bankruptcy judges stated, "This is
the sound bite. The war on fees is over. The bright line of $300 is gone." 62
Coupled with the concern over fee awards is the fact that the attorneys
that represent debtors in large, Chapter 11 cases comprise a small, elite
57 Cf. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV.
757 (1995) (explaining how a similar process involving the Delaware state courts' interpretation of state
corporate law may lead to a lock-in effect in the market for corporate charters).
58 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994).
59 See, e-g., Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., Inc., 50 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing
bankruptcy court's refusal to award New York rates); In re Washington Mfg. Co., 101 B.R. 944 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1989) (awarding out-of-state rates); In re Wendy's of Mont., Inc., 111 B.R. 314 (Bankr.
Mont. 1988) (refusing to award nonlocal rates); In re Frontier Airlines, Inc., 74 B.R. 973 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1987) (same).
60 See Houston, We Know We Have a Problem (But We're Working On t!), 35 BANKR. CT. DEC.
(CRR) No. 12, at AI (Feb. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Houston].
61 Seeid. atAl,A8.
62 Id. at AS.
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community. Between 1980 and 1998, only thirty-four firms represented
three or more publicly traded companies with assets in excess of $100 mil-
lion.63 Of these firms, only six represented more than ten such debtors. 64
The small size of this community explains two important aspects of bank-
ruptcy forum shopping patterns. First, the small number of key players
means that information about bankruptcy courts is disseminated relatively
efficiently. Since the law firms are repeat players, they have an incentive to
monitor the activity of the bankruptcy courts that are likely potential ven-
ues. Much of this information is not readily available to the general public.
For example, many of the important attributes of the practices in a particu-
lar bankruptcy court are not apparent from reading published opinions.
Bankruptcy judges have a broad range of discretion, which they exercise in
a variety of ways, and only the parties involved in a given case will obtain
direct information about how a judge exercises her discretion. This poten-
tial private information problem, however, is ameliorated by the small, co-
hesive nature of the bankruptcy bar.
Second, lawyers are not bound to file in the jurisdiction in which their
offices are physically located. Whereas forum shopping in general civil
litigation may be limited by the fact that most attorneys practice in the local
courts to which they are admitted, and thus have little incentive to have
their clients file in another jurisdiction, bankruptcy attorneys are qualified
to handle reorganization cases anywhere. Moreover, because fierce com-
petition exists for big cases, firms jealously guard their reputations for pro-
viding the most effective representation to debtors. If mishandling a case
causes greater harm to a firm's reputation than the reputational benefits ac-
cruing from properly handling a case, we would expect the debtor's counsel
to be quite risk averse in advising firms on where to file their petitions.65
Managers thus prefer a forum hospitable to their interests, and the
debtor's attorneys prefer a forum that does not scrutinize fee applications
too closely. The degree to which these preferences are satisfied will be di-
rectly affected by the behavior of individual bankruptcy judges.
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, attorneys had
little information that they could use to make predictions about any par-
ticular judge's behavior under the new law.66 Chapter 11 was an innovative
63 See Big Case Lawyers/Big Case Firms, 33 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) No. 5, at chart 2 (Oct. 20,
1998) (reporting findings compiled by Lynn LoPucki) [hereinafter Big Case Lawyers].
64 See id. Of these six firms, four had their main offices in New York, one had its main office in
Delaware (and this firm, representing 44 debtors, had the most representation of any firm), and one had
its main office in Los Angeles.
65 On the tendency of reputation to lead to overly cautious advice, see Donald C. Langevoort and
Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 375,394-99 (1997).
66 The predecessor to the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, contained reorganization
provisions, but they differed significantly from those in the Code. See J. RONALD TROST ET AL., THE
NEW FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE (1979).
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feature of the Bankruptcy Code when it was enacted. Moreover, the new
Code contained provisions whose effects were unclear ex ante and which
required interpretation.67 Furthermore, some of its provisions expressly
vested discretion in the bankruptcy judges.68 Thus, when the Bankruptcy
Code went into effect, lawyers had little information on which venues would
best promote the interests of the managers who hired them and which venues
would be more permissive towards attorneys fees. In other words, they did
not know where to file in order to best satisfy their preferences.
Faced with this uncertainty, it is not surprising that the Southern Dis-
trict of New York received many of the early cases filed under the new
Code. A number of firms have headquarters in New York, thus making the
Southern District a convenient venue for the firm's managers. Also, several
important investment banks and money center banks, often major players in
a corporate reorganization,69 are located in New York City. Finally, New
York City has long been home to many leading commercial and corporate
lawyers. A high percentage of the most respected lawyers who serve as
debtor counsel are based in New York.70 Thus, convenience was a significant
factor in initially making the Southern District an attractive filing venue.7'
Once the first few Chapter 11 cases were filed in the Southern District,
bankruptcy lawyers perceived that its bankruptcy courts were exercising
their discretion in "prodebtor" ways and were routinely approving attorney
fee requests. As New York developed this reputation, a lock-in effect oc-
67 See, e-g., Bank of Am. v. 203 North LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999) (addressing,
but not definitively resolving, the issue of whether "new value" exception to absolute priority survived
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code); United Saving Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest As-
socs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (resolving the issue of whether "adequate protection" requires compen-
sation for delayed recovery).
68 For example, see 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) (bankruptcy court empowered to issue "any order...
that is necessary or appropriate"); 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1994) (bankruptcy court empowered to lift
automatic stay for "cause"); 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (1994) (bankruptcy court can approve payment of
"reasonable" attorneys' fees); 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1994) (bankruptcy court may extend exclusivity pe-
riod for "cause").
69 Money center banks often provide "debtor-in-possession" financing for Chapter 11 firms. Chemical
Bank was the first major bank to create a separate DIP financing unit, and other major lenders include
Bankers Trust New York, Citibank, and General Electric Capital Corp. See Maria Carapeto, Does Debtor-
in-Possession Financing Add Value?, at 2 (Working Paper, March 12, 1999). Also, investment banks often
provide advice in major Chapter 11 cases, especially concerning the value of the firm's assets.
70 For example, since 1980, New York attorneys have served as lead counsel in half of the 18 larg-
est bankruptcies of publicly held companies. See Big Case Lawyers, supra note 63, at chart 3.
71 The first "major" case filed under the Bankruptcy Code was the Johns-Manville bankruptcy,
which was filed on August 26, 1982 in the Southern District of New York. Counsel were based in New
York, but the corporate headquarters were in Denver, and assets were located across the country, though
there were none in New York. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at n.56. Manville chose the
Southern District because many of the participants were in New York and it viewed the bankruptcy
court there favorably. See id.
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curred.72  Attorneys advising clients on the appropriate choice of bank-
ruptcy venue could tell them that the Southern District was a favorable,
"prodebtor" forum. By comparison, these lawyers would need to be more
cautious in forecasting the debtor's fate in other venues where the courts
were less predictable. These effects were self-reinforcing: as more and
more firms filed in New York, lawyers received further positive reinforce-
ment about the desirability of the Southern District. Thus, by 1988, the
Southern District of New York was admittedly the bankruptcy venue of
choice for large, publicly traded corporations.
However, that is not the remarkable part of the bankruptcy venue story.
Given the path dependent nature of the process, one would expect that, with
the enactment of the Code, one jurisdiction would gain a reputation as being
debtor friendly, and other firms would file there whenever it was a permis-
sible venue. Nor is it surprising that, early on, some firm would file in the
Southern District. Once that happened, and the Southern District gained a
reputation as being both debtor friendly and relatively liberal in approving
fee requests, it was predictable that other firms would also file there.
What is surprising is that the Southern District lost its position as the
preferred venue. Patterns of behavior often become entrenched. Moreover,
there were few natural competitors to the Southern District to become the
situs of bankruptcy filings. Effective competitors needed to be venues widely
available for many firms. Most of the available venue choices were not dis-
tributed in a manner that satisfied this criterion. For instance, if we examine
all of the major corporations in the United States, their principal assets are
not concentrated in any one area of the country. Corporate headquarters, to
the extent that one location dominates, tend to be in New York City. This
leaves one other permissible venue basis for a potential competitor: the com-
pany's state of incorporation. Delaware was the only state that had a decided
advantage in this regard, as many of the major corporations in this country
are incorporated there. This made Delaware the logical competitor for the
Southern District for the position as the pre-eminent bankruptcy venue.
But it was not enough for such a potential competitor to exist. Once
people have established patterns of behavior, only an external shock will
cause them to switch their way of doing things.7  Such a shock came in
72 For a discussion of the lock-in effect in the terms of corporate contracts, see Klausner, supra note
57, at 789-812.
73 Recall that in the 1980s no large publicly traded firm bypassed the Southern District when it was
available.
74 This was not the first time that Delaware had been the beneficiary of another state's loss of its po-
sition as a pre-eminent legal center. Prior to 1900, New Jersey had been the home of most of the major
American corporations. It enjoyed many of the same advantages that the Southern District did in the
1980s. However, in 1913 New Jersey's then-lame-duck-governor, Woodrow Wilson, decided to break
up the oil trusts. Most of these corporations fled south to Delaware and reincorporated there. This
shock ultimately led to Delaware becoming the premier state of incorporation and leader in the field of
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1990 when the managers of Continental Airlines, which had been through
bankruptcy in 1983, decided that the firm needed to seek protection under
Chapter 11 again. The bankruptcy venue statute offered Continental three
choices: Houston, where its headquarters was located; the Southern District
of New York, where Eastern Airlines, an affiliated company, was in Chap-
ter 11; and Delaware, where it was incorporated. Houston was unattractive
because Continental hadyreviously filed for bankruptcy there and the case
had not gone smoothly.7 The second option, New York, was also a poor
candidate because the Eastern Airlines' bankruptcy had turned into a con-
tentious affair.76
This left Delaware. So Continental filed its petition in the Delaware
bankruptcy court. At the time, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court had only
one judge, Helen Balick.77 She handled the Continental case proficiently
and, in doing so, earned a reputation as being both accessible and prodebtor.
Moreover, attorneys perceived that she did not quibble over their fee requests.
After this beneficial precedent was established, Delaware quickly sup-
planted the Southern District as the preferred bankruptcy venue. The speed
of this change was accelerated by the greater certainty about which judge
would decide a Delaware bankruptcy case than one filed in the Southern
District of New York. For example, in 1990, Delaware had only one bank-
ruptcy judge, whereas there were five bankruptcy judges in the Southern
District of New York. Firms thus knew which judge they would get in Dela-
ware. Even when the Delaware Bankruptcy Court added a second judge, he
quickly established a similar reputation to that of his senior colleague.7' Af-
ter 1988, when the responsibility for case assignments for bankruptcy cases
filed in the Southern District was transferred to the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts in Washington, D.C., lawyers perceived that there
was more variation among bankruptcy judges' treatment of the large corpo-
rate filings in the Southern District than in Delaware.79
corporate law. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 677 (1989).
75 See DELANEY, supra note 43, ch. 4.
76 See Christi Harlan, Legal Perspective: Continental's Latest Chapter 11 Flight Lands in Dela-
ware, Could Be Re-Routed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1990, at B4; Bill Mintz, Delavare Debut/Continental
Picks Cast of Unknowns for Bankruptcy, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 6, 1991, at 1, available in 1991 WL
3895553.
77 See Barbara Franklin, Welcome to Delaware, Wilmington Court Favored for Bankruptcy Filings,
207 N.Y. L.J., March 19, 1992, at 5.
78 See Agger, supra note 20, at I ("By having only two bankruptcy judges, there was an element of
predictability in terms of how a case would be handled."); see also Houston, supra note 60, at A8 (bank-
ruptcy attorneys concerned with reliability and consistency).
79 Eisenberg and LoPucki note that, prior to 1988, it appears that judge assignment may not have been
random in the Southern District. Any doubts about the blindness of the assignment process were removed
in 1988 when the assignment process was moved to Washington D.C. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra
note 8, at 983-84. To the extent that this decreased the value of filing in the Southern District, it made it
easier for Delaware to supplant it as venue king; see also 6 CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, No. 10, at 15, 16
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At the same time that Delaware was becoming an attractive venue option
for large publicly held corporations filing for Chapter 11 reorganizations, the
rise of the prepackaged bankruptcy further enhanced Delaware's favorable
position. A prepackaged bankruptcy is a hybrid of the options normally asso-
ciated with financial distress: an out-of-court restructuring and a full-blown
Chapter 11. Typically, when a firm is initially faced with financial distress,
it first tries to negotiate new payment terms with its existing creditors.
Many firms are able to do so and therefore never file for bankruptcy.80
In other instances, these negotiations fail, and the firm files for reorgani-
zation under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The goal of a Chapter 11
reorganization is to confirm a plan of reorganization which restructures the
firm's payment obligations.8' This plan, often proposed by the firm's man-
agers, is the result of extensive negotiations among the interested parties.
These negotiations take place after the firm has filed for bankruptcy."2
Perhaps the most crucial difference between a restructuring outside of
bankruptcy and a restructuring inside of bankruptcy is the treatment of dis-
senting creditors. Without resort to the bankruptcy process, a creditor's
payment rights can only be modified with that creditor's consent.83 This
creates potentially enormous holdout problems in getting an agreement on
the terms of the restructuring. In a bankruptcy proceeding, however, the
court has the power to bind a dissenting minority of creditors to modifica-
tions approved by a majority of similarly-situated creditors in that class.84
A class is deemed to approve a plan when at least half of the class members
collectively holding at least two-thirds of the amount of debt that the class
owns approve the plan. 5 The majority thus binds the dissenters, thereby
reducing the holdout problem significantly. This power to bind dissenting
creditors comes at a cost, though. Formal bankruptcy reorganizations are
(quoting an attorney as stating "I've always said: If you want to destroy Delaware, you don't have to pass [a
rule about] venue. You only have to add a third judge who is not consistent in the rulings.").
so See Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization
Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1191 (1991) (73 of 156 junk bond issues successfully completed exchanges); Stuart
Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards and Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990) (50 of Ill firms in financial
distress restructured without filing a bankruptcy petition); Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt Re.
structuring: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315 (1990)
(80 of 169 firms in financial distress restructured without filing a bankruptcy petition). For an argument
that these out of court restructurings do not reduce debt sufficiently, see Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions
Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997).
s1 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1994); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 240-66
(Rev. ed. 1993).
82 See BAIRD, supra note 81.
83 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 316(b), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1994); John C. Cof-
fee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender
Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHt. L. REv. 1207 (1991); Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in
Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987).
84 11 U.S.C. § 1 123(a)(4) (1999).
85 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1999).
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much more expensive than informal workouts.16 Not surprisingly, these
expenses increase the longer that the firm remains in Chapter 11.
Prepackaged bankruptcies are a hybrid of these two options. In a pre-
packaged case, the firm negotiates a plan of reorganization with its major
creditors prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. The firm need not secure
unanimous consent to its proposal, however. Rather, the firm tries to obtain
the agreement of a sufficient number of creditors to the plan to ensure that it
can be confirmed under the voting procedures of the Bankruptcy Code. The
firm then files a bankruptcy petition and, concurrently, its plan of reorgani-
zation. The creditors vote on the plan shortly after the filing. This option
allows the firm to eliminate any holdouts by dissenting creditors. The pre-
packaged bankruptcy thus provides the firm with the benefit of class-wide
voting to minimize holdout problems, while simultaneously minimizing the
time the firm spends in bankruptcy.
This type of bankruptcy filing has become increasingly popular in re-
cent years. In LoPucki and Whitford's study of Chapter 11 bankruptcies
ending before 1989, only 2 of the 43 firms in their sample filed prepack-
aged bankruptcies.87 More generally, between 1986 and 1990, of 633 pub-
licly held companies which filed for bankruptcy, only 8 (1.2%) were
prepackaged bankruptcies.88 This changed markedly between 1991 and
1997. During that time period, 622 publicly held companies filed for bank-
ruptcy, of which 70 (11.3%) were prepackaged bankruptcies.89 Roughly
half of the prepackaged bankruptcies were filed in Delaware. 90
This preference for Delaware in the case of prepackaged bankruptcies
is greater than the preference for Delaware in more traditional Chapter 11
cases. Delaware's advantage in this area is similar to its advantage in the
traditional Chapter 11 setting. Delaware processes its cases a bit quicker
than do other venues. Moreover, attorneys know that Delaware has experi-
ence in processing this type of case; no other venue has handled nearly as
many. Indeed, in many situations, it may be that Delaware is the only
venue choice available that has handled this type of proceeding. The
86 Chapter 11 contains many procedural devices and often takes a good deal of time to complete.
Both of these facts raise the costs of the procedure. The estimates for direct costs in Chapter II range
from 2.8% to 7.5% of firm value. See James Ang et al., The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bank-
ruptcy: A Note, 37 J. FIN. 219 (1982); Jerold Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337
(1977); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990). The indirect costs of Chapter 11 may even be higher. See Weiss, supra.
While there is no empirical data on the costs of workouts, few would argue that they approach the costs
associated with a full-scale Chapter 11 proceeding.
87 The two firms were Oxoco and Crystal Oil. See Letter from Lynn M. LoPucki to Robert K. Ras-
mussen (July 28, 1997) (on file with the authors).
88 See 1998 YEARBOOK, supra note 49, at 144.
89 See id.
90 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8, at 989, tbl. I (Nineteen of thirty-nine prepackaged cases
in their study filed in Delaware).
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quickness and experience of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, coupled with
its reputation for approving fee requests, makes Delaware an attractive
venue for prepackaged bankruptcies.
Today, Delaware is the preferred venue for both traditional Chapter 11
cases and prepackaged bankruptcies. Although it was a traditional case-
Continental Airlines-that generated the impetus to move cases to
Delaware, statistically the preference for Delaware is stronger with
prepackaged bankruptcies than it is for traditional Chapter 11 cases.
C. The Criticisms of the Rise of Delaware
Critics of forum shopping have been quick to note this rapid increase
in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court's caseload. Three events have high-
lighted this concern: a critical report by the Federal Judicial Center at-
tacking certain practices of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, the Delaware
District Court's unprecedented decision to strip the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court of its power to hear any Chapter 11 case, and the National Bank-
ruptcy Commission's recommendation that Congress delete a firm's state of
incorporation from the list of potential bankruptcy venues. These events,
and the ostensible justifications offered for each, are examined below.
The history of bankruptcy law in this country is largely a story about
the bankruptcy bar. Bankruptcy lawyers helped to create the law of corpo-
rate reorganizations in the absence of federal legislation in the 1800s, and
subsequent legislation has been shaped by both these lawyers and those
concerned about their power.9 It is thus not surprising that the debate
about venue selection is one driven by the interests of bankruptcy lawyers.
Each of the judicial and administrative actions listed above were initiated
because bankruptcy attorneys complained about forum shopping.
Bankruptcy venue matters a great deal to these attorneys for a simple
financial reason: the parties involved in a bankruptcy proceeding generally
hire local counsel. This rule means that the bankruptcy proceeding of a
large, publicly held firm, involving numerous parties, will provide jobs for
a large percentage, if not all, of a district's bankruptcy attorneys. While this
raises the expected wealth of these attorneys, this increase comes at the ex-
pense of bankruptcy attorneys practicing in other potential venues.
The competition for the attorneys' fees generated by these bankruptcy
cases is a zero-sum game in that the lawyers in the "winning" districts re-
ceive exactly the same amount that those in the "losing" district give up.
But while a large number of the winners today all come from the same dis-
trict (Delaware), the losers come from a larger number of jurisdictions.
91 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost, 1999
SUP. CT. REv. 393 (2000); Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1997); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American
Bankruptcy Law, 67 FoRD. L. REV. 497 (1998); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Banknptcy
Act, 15 BANKR. DEv. L.J. 321 (1999).
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Although these losing attorneys are geographically diverse, the bankruptcy
bar is relatively small, and they can, if they choose, easily form a coalition
to protect their interests. 92 Their geographic diversity also strengthens their
political power as they have influence with a greater number of friendly
legislators, judges, and politicians as a whole than the more concentrated
group of winners. Thus, we would predict that the losers in the venue game
should be more effective in securing changes to improve their situation than
the winners will be in protecting the status quo.
This appears to be exactly what has happened over the last few years.
The critics of the current system of forum shopping were primarily attor-
neys from outside New York and Delaware. As a first step in their attempts
to eliminate Delaware as an attractive bankruptcy venue, they were success-
ful in placing the venue selection question on the National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission's agenda for potential reforms of the federal bankruptcy
laws.93 The Commission's membership, while comprised of well-respected
bankruptcy professionals and two prominent federal judges, did not include
a single person from Delaware. 94 Its chair and vice-chair were both from
Midwestern states.95
At the time that the Commission began its work, academics had paid
scant attention to the subject of forum shopping by large firms in Chapter
11. Only one empirical study had been published. 96 While this study docu-
mented companies' statistical preference for filing in the Southern District
of New York in the 1980s, it concluded that the venue provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code should not be altered. Rather, the authors suggested,
Congress should turn its attention to actual judicial practices that it found
objectionable.97 However, the Commission requested that the Federal Judi-
cial Center further study the matter, in large part because of pressure from
its (non-Delaware) attorney members.98
Before the Federal Judicial Center had completed its study, the Com-
mission's staff had already proposed drastic reductions in the extant venue
provisions: first, that a company's place of incorporation be eliminated as
an appropriate venue for filing bankruptcy; 99 and, second, that a firm be
92 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1971).
93 This Commission was established by Congress to propose an overhaul of the nation's bankruptcy
law. See Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
94 See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REPORT, supra note 19, at 55-57.
95 See id.
96 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9.
9' Seeid. at45-51.
98 See BERMANT ET AL., supra note 10, at 7.
99 See National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Memorandum (Nov. 19, 1996) <http://www.
bankrupt.comcllalvenueml.html> (Proposal to Amend the Bankruptcy Venue Provisions Under 28
U.S.C. § 1408) (on file with authors); see also memorandum from Professor Lawrence P. King & Eliza-
beth I. Holland to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (Nov. 16, 1996) (on file with author).
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prevented from combining its bankruptcy proceeding with that of an affili-
ated firm, unless the firm that first filed for bankruptcy was the parent of the
second filing firm.' 00 The first proposal would eliminate the provision on
which most Delaware bankruptcy filings have been based, while the second
would reduce the availability of venue in the Southern District of New
York. The Commission tentatively adopted these recommendations on De-
cember 18, 1996 and February 21, 1997, and they were ultimately included
in the Commission's final report.' °t
The Federal Judicial Center released its draft report in early January
1997. The Report made no recommendations.' 0 2 Rather, it included a sub-
stantial body of evidence that has become a principal focus of the forum
shopping debate, consisting of a survey of bankruptcy judges, an empirical
analysis of filing trends, and an attempt to quantify the costs of forum
shopping to creditors. The judicial survey found that a significant minority
of bankruptcy judges (thirty-seven percent) thought that the bankruptcy
venue provisions should be amended, but that a roughly equal amount
(thirty-four percent) believed that no change was needed. 0 3 The filing
trend analysis chronicled the shift of large, publicly held, corporate bank-
ruptcy filings to Delaware, thereby confirming that Delaware had replaced
the Southern District of New York as the preferred bankruptcy venue.
The Report's most startling evidence concerned the Delaware Bank-
ruptcy Court's procedures for handling Chapter 11 filings. It documented
that court's informal method of case assignment, the debtor's counsels'
ability to find out which judge the case was assigned to before the petition
was filed, and these attorneys' practice of engaging in ex parte contacts
with the judge prior to filing the petition to inform the judge of the motions
they would make the first day of filing.'0
The Report also made a modest attempt to estimate the cost of forum
shopping. These estimates were restricted to calculating the increased air-
fare to the attorneys involved. The Report determined that, assuming that
the creditors' attorneys had to fly from where the creditor was located, the
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 The Report made reference to the Commission's earlier tentative recommendation concerning
venue, but did not take a position on the merits of that recommendation. See BERMANT, ET AL., supra
note 10, at 10.
103 BERMANT ET AL., supra note 10, at 22-25. Twenty-two percent of the judges responding to the
survey thought that there had been cases filed in other districts that should have been transferred to their
district. See id. at 19-22. Of the 52 cases that the judges identified as "misfiled," 22 were filed in Dela-
ware and 20 were filed in the Southern District of New York. See id.
104 See id. at 40-41. These practices have since been roundly condemned by the non-Delaware
bankruptcy bar. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 23, at B8 (Chicago bankruptcy attorney opining that the
process in Delaware Bankruptcy Court "would make a layperson doubt 'the objectivity of the proc-
ess."'); Delaware's Withdrawal of the Reference: What It Means, 30 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR) No. 4, at
Al6 (Feb. 11, 1997) (non-Delaware bankruptcy judge stating that he "wouldn't tolerate [Delaware's
practices] here").
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choice of Delaware as a forum would cost each party an additional $270
over what their costs would have been if the case had been filed where the
firm's assets were located.105 The Report did not address the larger ques-
tion of whether forum shopping increased attorneys' fees.
On January 23, 1997, shortly after the Commission's adoption of its
tentative proposal to eliminate the state of incorporation as an appropriate
venue, and the Federal Judicial Center's Report detailing the informal prac-
tices of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, the Delaware District Court re-
moved all Chapter 11 cases from the Delaware Bankruptcy Court. To
understand why this court had the power to make this change, we must first
examine the division of jurisdictional authority between the federal district
courts and bankruptcy courts. The federal district courts, which are Article
III courts, have original jurisdiction over all cases arising under federal
bankruptcy law.10 6 By contrast, bankruptcy courts, which were established
by Congress under Article I of the Constitution,10 7 cannot have the power to
adjudicate cases arising under the laws of the United States.08 Rather,
bankruptcy courts are adjuncts to the district courts and can assist the latter
when requested to do so.
The district courts have the power to refer any federal bankruptcy case
in the first instance to the bankruptcy court.1 09 In fact, every district court
in the country has issued orders exercising this power, thereby ensuring that
all bankruptcy cases commence in the bankruptcy court."0 The Delaware
District Court modified this standing order (called the "reference"), an ac-
tion never before taken by a district court, to remove corporate reorganiza-
tion cases from its bankruptcy court's jurisdiction."'
The Delaware District Court claimed that such extraordinary measures
were needed to relieve the burden on its bankruptcy judges." 2 This expla-
105 See BERMANT ET AL., supra note 10, at 42-55.
106 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1994).
107 Bankruptcy judges are appointed for 14-year terms rather than life tenure. See 28 U.S.C. §
152(b) (1999). Having life tenure is a sine qua non for being an Article III judge. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § I ("The Judges ... shall hold their Offices during good Behavior"); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530 (1962). For a debate on whether bankruptcy judges should be Article III judges, compare Su-
san Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article I1 Bankruptcy Court System, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 529
(1998) with Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges,
72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567 (1998).
108 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
109 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994).
"o See Leif M. Clark & Douglas E. Deutsch, The Delaware Gap: Exposing New Flaws in the
Scheme of Bankruptcy Referrals, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 257,258 (1997).
111 See id.
112 See January 23, 1997 Order of District Court ("WHEREAS, the judges of the district court have
determined that a significant increase in the number of bankruptcy cases has occurred and that it is ap-
propriate and necessary that judges of the district court participate in the handling of such cases .... ).
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nation was met with widespread incredulity. 1 3 Neither bankruptcy judge
had complained about the extant caseload, and the Delaware bankruptcy
court handled its cases more quickly than most courts.'t 4 Instead, commen-
tators believed that the district court had been stung by the recent criticisms
leveled by the Review Commission and the Federal Judicial Center Report."'
In the wake of the district court's action, no large publicly held corporation
filed for bankruptcy anywhere in the country for more than five months. 116
On October 20, 1997, the Bankruptcy Review Commission issued its fi-
nal report to Congress. It recommended eliminating bankruptcy venue based
on state of incorporation, and limiting venue based on affiliation to those
cases where a subsidiary seeks to file in a district where its parent already is
in bankruptcy. Unbelievably, the report claimed that these proposals were
not "directed at the bankruptcy courts in the Southern District of New York,
those in Delaware, or in any other specific bankruptcy venue."'1 17 Rather, it
stated that the Commission was concerned that under the current Bankruptcy
Code large publicly held firms had too many potential forums from which to
choose. This overabundance of choices, the report went on, had led firms
to engage in forum shopping, 8 which was harmful to small creditors.' 9
Despite the report's stated rationale, the history of the Commission and its
venue discussions make it abundantly clear that it was the (non-Delaware)
lawyers, and not small creditors, who were behind these recommendations.
Small creditors were not interested in these proposals. Their lack of
enthusiasm, however, did not stem from collective action problems; several
effective organizations represent the interests of small creditors, especially
the National Association of Credit Management. More likely, as we show
in Part II below, small creditors are indifferent because current venue
113 See Davis, supra note 15, at BI ("But some observers believe [the district court] is trying to
counter critics who contend that the Delaware court is too easy on corporate debtors and who want to
yank state of incorporation as a place to file bankruptcy."); Delaware District Court Withdraws the Ref-
erence in Chapter 11 Cases, 30 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) No. 3 (Feb. 4, 1997) ("No one believes the
reference was withdrawn because of the heavy caseload."); Claudia MacLachlan, Ex Parte Contact Be-
hind Delaware Bankruptcy Shakeup?, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 10, 1997, at A10 ("Bankruptcy lawyers say the
real reason for the change was the Jan. 10 Judicial Center report and the growing controversy over
whether debtors should be allowed to file in Delaware-where they are incorporated-instead of where
they do business.").
114 The Federal Judicial Center Report, issued shortly before the district court's order, confirmed the
speed of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court. See BERMANT, ET AL., supra note 10, at 37.
115 See supra note 113.
116 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8, at 986. The Delaware bankruptcy court saw its first
Chapter 11 case, large or small, in April 1997, when it was assigned the case of Grossman's Inc. See
Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Gets First Sign ificant Case Since District Court Took Over, 30 BANKR. CT.
DEC. (CRR) No. 15, at Al (Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Delaware Bankruptcy Judge].
117 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REPORT, supra note 19, at 779.
"' Id. at 776-79.
"9 Id. at 776-77.
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shopping practices impose only small costs on them.1 20 Yet, even if the cur-
rent law possibly unduly burdens small creditors, they were not the ones
aggressively lobbying for change.
The Commission's Report did not lead directly to bankruptcy legisla-
tion. Rather, individual members of Congress, who viewed the Commis-
sion's recommendations concerning the reform of consumer bankruptcy as
too generous to consumers, introduced their own legislation seeking to re-
strict consumer access to bankruptcy.12 1 While this legislation did contain
some provisions that applied to corporate reorganizations, it did not include
any proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code's venue provisions. The
House and Senate failed to reach agreement with the White House in the
closing days of the 105th Congress.
The reform legislation was reintroduced in the 106th Congress. As in-
troduced, it did not affect the corporate bankruptcy venue provision. Dur-
ing the House Judiciary Committee's mark-up session on the bill,
Representative Howard L. Berman, from Los Angeles, inserted an "anti-
Delaware" amendment in the bill on a voice vote.' 22 This amendment,
which differs from the one offered by the Commission, provides that a cor-
poration is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which its principal place of
business is located. In other words, a corporation would no longer be a citi-
zen of the state in which it was incorporated. The amendment did not affect
the "affiliate" rule, which, in the past, has allowed many firms to file in the
Southern District of New York. The House passed the bill containing this
amendment.
The response from Delaware was swift, with both of Delaware's sena-
tors vowing to protect the status quo. Senator William V. Roth, Jr., stated,
"I will do everything I can to ensure that Delaware-incorporated businesses
can continue to have their bankruptcy reorganizations adjudicated in Dela-
ware.' 23 Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr.'s office issued a statement that, "This
is a huge issue for the Delaware bar.... Sen. Biden is committed and de-
termined that it will not be in the final bill.' 24 The bankruptcy bill passed
by the Senate did not contain an "anti-Delaware" amendment.
25
Regardless of how this legislative issue is resolved, one thing is vividly
clear. The one group most affected by current venue practices that would
benefit most from the changes proposed by the Commission is bankruptcy
120 See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
121 See Jacob M. Schlesinger, Card Games: As Bankruptcies Surge, Creditors Lobby Hard to Get
Tougher Laws, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1998, at AI.
122 See Celia Cohen, Sneak Attack: Delaware Delegation Battles Back Against Congressional Bill
that Would Curb Bankruptcy Practice, 2 DEL. L. WKLY., May 4, 1999, at 1.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Interestingly, the corporate reorganization provision enacted in 1934 allowed firms to file in Dela-
ware due in large part to the efforts of a senator from Delaware. This provision was removed when the law
was revamped in 1938. By that time, this senator had been replaced. See Skeel, supra note 25, at 8-14.
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attorneys from outside of Delaware and the Southern District. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that they are the ones who have lobbied to remove the
place of incorporation and "affiliate in bankruptcy" provisions from the list
of permissible venues. They have been opposed by the Delaware bar.
H. THE RACE TO DELAWARE IN CORPORATE LAW
The debate over the propriety of financially distressed firms filing for
Chapter 11 reorganization in Delaware recalls the long-standing academic
battle over the propriety of healthy firms incorporating in Delaware. The cur-
rent evidence suggests that, in general, the "race" to Delaware produces some
efficiency gains. That debate has relevance to the problem of bankruptcy fo-
rum shopping because the mechanisms that the "race to the top" theorists
claim produce efficiency gains provide insights into the problems with the
current venue provisions, and suggest ways in which those provisions can
be amended so as to increase the efficiency of the Bankruptcy Code.
As every student of American corporate law knows, a disproportionate
number of publicly held firms are incorporated in Delaware. The reasons
for this phenomenon and its efficiency implications are hotly debated. In
1974, William Cary argued that the preference for Delaware resulted from
managers of firms seeking out the jurisdiction which best protected their
interests, often at the expense of shareholders. 126 Cary saw a race to the
bottom. The engine propelling this race was the claim that managers con-
trolled the decision about which state to incorporate in, that managers
would act selfishly to select a jurisdiction with laws favorable to their posi-
tion, and that shareholders lacked the ability to influence this decision. 127
This argument was an application of the story of American corporate law
told by Berle and Means in the 1930s: the separation of ownership and
control allows managers to run the firms for their own benefit, often at the
expense of shareholder interests.
28
126 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974). He claimed that if management has unfettered discretion, they will adopt laws that maximize
their personal benefits rather than those to shareholders. States want to maximize their revenues from
incorporation fees and other taxes on companies to try to entice the parties in control of incorporation or
reincorporation decisions to select their state for incorporation. See id. at 668. The competition among
states to attract companies leads them to adopt pro-management corporate codes.
This competition does not stop when a company initially selects its state of incorporation. Corporate
managers can subsequently elect to reincorporate in another state subject to shareholder approval. See
Bebehuk, supra note 2, at 1836-40 (claiming that even though management needs shareholder consent to
reincorporate, shareholders will rationally remain ignorant and even consent to a reincorporation that
reduces shareholder value). Therefore, these authors argue that a state can best attract a corporation and
ensure that it remains in the state by selecting corporate laws that are favorable to management.
127 Cary argued that the national government should intervene and adopt a federal corporate law to
remedy this problem. See Cary, supra note 126, at 701.
128 See ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1933).
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Ralph Winter responded that the race to Delaware was actually a race to
the top that increased firm value.1 29 The thrust of his argument was that the
need to obtain capital at the cheapest cost forced managers to select the state
that provided the most efficient corporate laws that maximized firn value.
Firms whose managers selected inefficient jurisdictions to further their own
self-interest at the expense of the shareholders would be at a competitive dis-
advantage and would suffer depressed share prices.1 30 The market for corpo-
rate control would punish these managers by removing them from power.
The linchpin of the theoretical argument for the race to the top is that
managers make the incorporation decision at a time when their interests are
generally convergent with those of the shareholders. At the time of incor-
poration, the future wealth of the managers is directly correlated with the
future wealth of the firm. If the firm does well, the managers will prosper;
if the firm does poorly, the managers will fare less well. For the firm to do
well, it must be able to finance its projects. For most firms, such financing
comes from outside investors, either through debt or additional sales of eq-
uity. Outside investors are quite capable of ascertaining the possibility of
managers taking actions that benefit themselves at the expense of the firm
as a whole. Thus, they will charge higher interest rates on debt and pay a
lower price for equity to compensate for this risk. These actions make it
more expensive to finance the firm's projects, and thus more likely that the
firm's projects, once they are undertaken, will fail to produce sufficient
revenue. Managers, in turn, anticipate this result, and thus have an incen-
tive to incorporate in states that provide corporate laws that best promote
the interests of the firm as a whole. In short, Winter's argument rejected the
Berle and Means conception of the corporation as incomplete. Corpora-
tions function in markets, and these markets provide constraints on the
ability of managers to further their interests at the expense of shareholders.
129 Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) [hereinafter Winter, State Law]; see also RALPH K. WINTER, THE
GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978).
130 Winter claimed that market forces from the capital, product, and corporate control markets lead
corporate managers to select a state of incorporation that will maximize firm value and deter them from re-
incorporating in states with laws that are detrimental to shareholders. See Winter, State Law, supra note
129, at 256. He wrote that:
(1) If Delaware permits corporate management to profit at the expense of shareholders and other
states do not, then earnings of Delaware corporations must be less than earnings of comparable
corporations chartered in other states and shares in the Delaware corporations must trade at lower
prices. (2) Corporations with lower earnings will be at a disadvantage in raising debt or equity
capital. (3) Corporations at a disadvantage in the capital market will be at a disadvantage in the
product market and their share price will decline, thereby creating a threat of a takeover which may
replace management. To avoid this result, corporations must seek out legal systems more attrac-
tive to capital. (4) States seeking corporate charters will thus try to provide legal systems which
optimize the shareholder-corporation relationship.
Id.
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The debate over incorporation in Delaware has been extended and re-
fined over the past twenty years.13 ' Recent work explores the mechanisms
by which Delaware retains its status as the leader in the incorporation arena.
These mechanisms, which we discuss below, tend to produce efficient law.
Empirical research has shown that reincorporating in Delaware does not de-
crease the value of the firms' shares, thus supporting the race to the top po-
sition.13 2  Recently, Professor Robert Daines has compared the value of
firms incorporated in Delaware to the value of firms incorporated else-
where. He found that Delaware firms have higher values, thus bolstering
the race to the top argument.1
33
Yet few believe that Delaware produces optimal laws. There are situa-
tions where managerial self-interest departs from the interest of shareholders.
As Lucian Bebchuck has pointed out, mid-stream amendments to the corpo-
rate charter have the potential for enriching management at the expense of
shareholders.3 Also, managers have been able to persuade most states, in-
cluding Delaware, to pass laws that inhibit hostile takeovers. Such laws pro-
tect incumbent managers and reduce the wealth of shareholders.135  These
131 See generally ROMANO, supra note 37, for a discussion of this debate.
132 In particular, several event studies have been conducted to see if corporations reincorporating in
Delaware suffer a reduction in their share price. None of these studies finds a significant decrease in
stock price associated with reincorporation in Delaware, while some find significant price increases. See
id. at 17-18 (stating that none of the five event studies she analyzed found that reincorporation in Dela-
ware had a negative effect on stock price); Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance ofthe
Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 48 (1989) (same, although for
firms incorporated in Delaware, the passage of§ 102(b)(7) of the Delaware corporate code had a signifi-
cant decrease in their stock value); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Char-
ters: 'Unhealthy Competition' vs. Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 281 (1980) (concluding that
shareholders were not hurt by reincorporation to Delaware); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some
Pieces of the Reincorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225,280 (1985) (same); see also Allen Hy-
man, The Delaware Controversy-The Legal Debate, 4 J. CORP. L. 259 (1979); Jeffery Netter & Annette
Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The Recent Experience, 18 FIN. MGMT. 29 (1989).
These results support the claim that states are racing to the top, not to the bottom. Bebchuk offers three
alternative explanations for the results. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1448 (1992). First,
he argues that the negative effect on share prices from reincorporating in Delaware could have been
outweighed by management's announcement of other information that was favorable to the sharehold-
ers. Second, reincorporation to Delaware might not have a negative effect on share prices if the original
state of incorporation had corporate laws similar to Delaware. Third, the pro-shareholder rules of Dela-
ware might outweigh the anti-shareholder rules. Romano disagrees with these criticisms. She argues
that if Bebchuk is correct, then there should be a difference in the stock price reactions of firms that re-
incorporate in Delaware for pro-manager purposes (no offsetting positive event) as opposed to pro-
shareholder purposes (positive offsetting event). See ROMANO, supra note 37, at 18. No such effect is
observed, which suggests that there is no negative effect on stock prices from the reincorporation.
133 See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? (draft).
134 See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1836-40 (claiming that even though management needs shareholder
consent to reincorporate, shareholders will rationally remain ignorant and consent to a reincorporation that
reduces shareholder value).
135 The problem with these statutes is that they protect inefficient management by reducing the chance
of hostile takeovers, and limit the effectiveness of the corporate control market to act as a constraint on the
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developments rebut the assertion that any state, even Delaware, produces op-
timal corporate law. Nevertheless, Delaware's corporate law appears to be
more efficient than that of its competitors. For present purposes, we want to
spell out the mechanism by which Delaware tends to produce such laws.
As Winter recognized, managers have an incentive, at least at the time
of incorporation, to select the jurisdiction providing the most efficient legal
regime. This is the demand side of the equation. But what about the supply
side of the equation? Part of the theory of the race to the top is not only that
managers will select the most efficient legal rules available, but that states
will compete for incorporation business, thus producing more efficient
laws. The literature has identified three crucial ways in which Delaware
has committed itself to produce laws favored by managers.
One mechanism is that Delaware has structured its finances so that it
relies heavily on the income produced from corporate charters. With some
minor variations, roughly seventeen percent of Delaware's total revenues
are derived from its corporate chartering business. 136 Politicians thus know
that to the extent they pass legislation which leads to a decrease in the num-
ber of firms incorporating in Delaware, they will either have to slash the
state's budget or find replacement sources of revenue.
A second mechanism is the creation of an experienced judiciary. The
Delaware Chancery Court is nationally recognized for its expertise in corpo-
rate law.137 Moreover, the selection process of judges is designed to maintain
a high level of judicial competence. This long history of able judges has pro-
duced a detailed and consistent body of precedent on which firns can rely. 3 '
Perhaps underlying all of these mechanisms is the interest of Delaware
lawyers.139- Delaware lawyers earn a significant amount of income based on
their knowledge of Delaware corporate law. They thus have an incentive to
ensure that firms retain the preference to incorporate in Delaware. To this
end, they control the selection process for judges, and would lobby hard
against legislative changes that would cause firms to by-pass Delaware.
divergence of management's interests from those of shareholders. Winter believes that in order to make the
corporate control market a more effective deterrent, one might have to make an exception to the state
corporate system and allow federal regulation to preempt state takeover statutes. See Winter, State Law,
supra note 129, at 289. However, Winter notes that Congress's past legislation regarding the corporate
control market, Le the Williams Act, has not been favorable to shareholders. See id. at 291.
136 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 490 (1987).
137 See Klausner, supra note 57, at 845.
138 See id. at 845-46. Ehud Kamar, while agreeing as to the quality of the Delaware bench, has sug-
gested that it produces indeterminate laws that have the effect of enhancing its competitive advantage.
In short, this indeterminacy, while it reduces the value of Delaware's laws, reduces the value of the laws
of other jurisdictions to an even greater extent by making them incompatible with Delaware law. This
observation is consistent with both race to the top and race to the bottom theories. See Ehud Kamar, A
Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908 (1998).
139 Macey & Miller, supra note 136, at 503-06.
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In short, these mechanisms commit Delaware to producing corporate
law that, on balance, increases efficiency. In the next Part, we first analyze
the normative desirability of the current bankruptcy venue provisions, and
then, drawing on the general corporate law literature recounted above, sug-
gest a crucial amendment to align managers' interests with those of the firm
and improve the efficiency of the bankruptcy laws.
Ill. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RACE TO DELAWARE FOR
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
A. The Social Desirability of Current Law for Prepackaged Bankruptcies
The efficiency implications of the current practice of filing for bank-
ruptcy in Delaware are, at first glance, unclear. While a firm's .managers
and attorneys who select its bankruptcy venue undoubtedly select the venue
that best promotes their interests, it does not necessarily follow that their
venue choice will be value-decreasing for the firm's owners. In other
words, when agents act selfishly that does not mean that their principals
necessarily incur agency costs-many times the two groups' interests coin-
cide. For our purposes, we must first distinguish between prepackaged
bankruptcy cases and more traditional Chapter 11 cases in order to assess
whether agency costs are prevalent in corporate reorganizations. We dis-
cuss prepackaged bankruptcies in this subpart, and traditional Chapter 11
proceedings in the two subsequent subparts.
Delaware has become the venue of choice for firms filing prepackaged
bankruptcies. 40 One recently completed empirical study of venue choice in
large Chapter 11 cases, conducted by Professors Eisenberg and LoPucki,
attempted to measure the extent to which prepackaged bankruptcies are
filed in Delaware. This study found that in cases filed between 1989 and
1997, nineteen of the thirty-nine prepackaged bankruptcies involving large,
publicly held corporations were filed in Delaware. 4 The study further
demonstrated that while Delaware is the preferred venue for both traditional
Chapter 11 filings and prepackaged cases, forum shopping is more preva-
140 See BERMANT ET AL., supra note 10, at 39-41.
141 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8, at 989. In this subpart of the article, the numbers re-
ported for prepackaged bankruptcies differ slightly depending on which data set we use. The Eisenberg
& LoPucki data set includes only Chapter 11 cases filed by publicly traded firms with assets, as meas-
ured in 1980 dollars, that exceed $100 million. See id. at 973-74. The numbers reported in the 1997,
1998 and 1999 Bankruptcy Yearbooks and Almanacs include the filings of all publicly traded firms. See
1997 YEARBOOK, supra note 48, at 45; 1998 YEARBOOK, supra note 49, at 43; 1999 YEARBOOK, supra
note 49, at 38. The numbers from the Federal Judicial Center Report are themselves drawn from the 1997
Bankruptcy Yearbook. See BERMANT ET AL., supra note 10, at 31. While these two sets of data thus differ
slightly in the number of firms that they contain, they both illustrate the same general patterns.
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lent in prepackaged cases. Indeed, since 1990, prepackaged bankruptcies
make up 38.8% of the large bankruptcy cases filed in Delaware.
1 42
What normative implications does this forum shopping of prepack-
aged bankruptcies have? If prepackaged bankruptcies increase the effi-
ciency of bankruptcy law, and Delaware plays a crucial role in facilitating
such bankruptcies, then the trend toward more such filings in Delaware
should be applauded. We claim that prepackaged bankruptcies do, in fact,
promote efficiency.
If a firm is in financial distress, but is still economically viable, then
creditors would favor revamping the firm's capital structure if they were
able to act collectively outside of bankruptcy.14 Yet, at this point in time,
the (nonbankruptcy) law forbids altering a creditor's repayment contract
without that creditor's consent.144 Thus, while as a group creditors may fa-
vor debt renegotiation, individual creditors may balk at a proposed renego-
tiation in the hopes that the firm will pay it off in full. In other words, debt
restructurings outside of bankruptcy suffer from holdout problems.
Strategic holdouts by disgruntled creditors will often force firms to file
Chapter 11 proceedings. This is confirmed by empirical studies showing
that out of all the firms in financial distress only one half are able to rene-
gotiate their debt outside of bankruptcy. 45 Bankruptcy law overcomes such
strategic holdouts through the use of class-wide voting procedures. 46 Pre-
packaged bankruptcies achieve a similar result by allowing the firm to im-
plement a value-increasing plan of reorganization with the consent of the
majority of creditors, despite the protests of those minority of creditors who
may be seeking to capture more than a proportionate share of the gain for
themselves. Moreover, they achieve this result at a lower cost than a tradi-
tional Chapter 11 proceeding.' 47
Creditors' interests as a group are advanced by this procedure. To un-
derstand this point, recall that in a prepackaged bankruptcy the firm must
obtain the agreement of a sufficient number of creditors to ensure that the
plan can be confirmed under the voting procedures of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Bankruptcy Code groups creditors into classes. The claims in each
142 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8, at 992-93.
143 On the now standard distinction between financial distress-inability to pay debts-and eco-
nomic distress-inability of revenues to cover costs-see Baird, supra note 30; Robert K. Rasmussen, The
Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1165-67 (1994).
The seminal work identifying the collective action problem that bankruptcy responds to is Thomas H. Jack-
son, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
144 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
145 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
146 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1994).
147 See Elizabeth Tashjian et al., Prepacks: An EmpiricalAnalysis ofPrepackaged Bankruptcies, 40 J.
FIN. ECON. 135, 144, tbl. 2 (1996) (explaining that the mean cost of a prepackaged bankruptcy is 1.8% of
firm value; the mean cost of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is 2.8% of firm value).
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class must be substantially similar.1 48 A class is deemed to approve a plan
when at least half of the class members collectively holding at least two-
thirds of the amount of debt that the class owns approve the plan.149 Fi-
nally, we assume that when creditors consider whether to support a plan of
reorganization their primary concern is their ultimate payout.
In this situation, creditors in a given class may vote differently on a
plan of reorganization for one of two reasons. First, they may disagree over
which course of action promises the greater return to creditors. In cases
where such uncertainty exists, the more efficient rule is to let a majority of
the claims, as measured by dollar amount, bind the class. 15' Alternatively, a
creditor may disagree for strategic reasons. The dissenter may know that
the proposed plan of reorganization is in the best interests of creditors as a
group, but nevertheless vote against it in an effort to gain more of the value
of the reorganized firm for itself. Little social gain stems from such be-
havior, and therefore the Bankruptcy Code's provisions should (and do)
override such dissent. We conclude that prepackaged bankruptcies are effi-
ciency-enhancing when compared to creditors' other options.
Despite their social welfare increasing nature, prepackaged bankrupt-
cies remain relatively rare phenomena. There were a total of eight prepack-
aged bankruptcies from 1986 to 1990. This increased to seven in 1991
alone, and seventy-nine from 1992 to 1999.152 Even during this last period,
only one out of every ten bankruptcies of a publicly held firm involved a
prepackaged bankruptcy. Statistically, the number of bankruptcy courts in
the country outnumber the sum of prepackaged bankruptcies filed in the
past decade.
There are efficiencies to be gained from handling many of these cases
in one jurisdiction. An experienced court could handle these cases more
quickly, which would enhance the attractiveness of a prepackaged bank-
ruptcy to a firm. Indeed, part of the attractiveness of a prepackaged bank-
ruptcy is its speed, which reduces its costs. For example, the average
prepackaged bankruptcy proceeding ends in less than two months. 5 3 Tra-
ditional Chapter 11 cases take more than a year longer to complete. 5 4 At-
torneys would also prefer courts that have demonstrated an ability to
expeditiously process a prepackaged bankruptcy case. Having convinced
the firm's managers that a prepackaged bankruptcy will be a relatively
148 See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994).
149 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994).
150 See Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, supra note 5, at 1836.
151 See Kevin A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv.
161, 168-69 (1999). Kordana and Posner show that the efficiency of current voting rules is more am-
biguous when they allow for strategic voting. See id. at 169-220.
152 See 1999 YEARBOOK, supra note 49, at 152. Again, the difference in numbers here and those
we cited earlier are due to the source from which they are drawn. See supra note 141.
153 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8, at 989.
'54 See id.
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quick (and therefore cheap) endeavor, attorneys have the incentive to steer
that bankruptcy to the forum that will best vindicate their prediction.155
This efficiency rationale is consistent with the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court's experience. After it competently handled its first prepackaged
bankruptcy case, it began to receive more of these cases. Many public
firms contemplating a bankruptcy filing had Delaware as an option either
because they were incorporated there, or had an affiliated entity incorpo-
rated there. Indeed, Delaware was the most common venue option for
firms. As more and more of these firms filed prepackaged bankruptcies in
Delaware, bankruptcy attorneys routinely recommended Delaware as the
venue of choice for prepackaged bankruptcies.15 6
Professors Eisenberg and LoPucki take issue with our analysis. They
argue that while Delaware is a bit quicker at handling prepackaged bank-
ruptcies than other courts, the difference is not statistically significant. 157
They contend that other courts are just as effective as the Delaware courts
in handling prepackaged bankruptcies, and thus the Delaware court's rela-
tive expertise is not the real reason that firms prefer Delaware.'5s
Professors Eisenberg and LoPucki fail to consider the choices that
debtors' attorneys face when advising their clients on where to file. These
attorneys will confront one of two situations: either the firm can file in only
one jurisdiction (Delaware) that has handled a prepackaged bankruptcy, or
the firm has a choice among experienced jurisdictions. In the first situation,
it is easy to see why Delaware would be chosen. Attorneys tend, on aver-
age, to be risk averse when advising their clients!"5 This risk aversion
would lead them to shy away from untested courts. When it is coupled with
the fact that Delaware is at least as fast on average as other jurisdictions,
this will lead bankruptcy attorneys to advise their clients to file in Dela-
ware. While no one has determined how many of the prepackaged cases
fall into this category, there are undoubtedly some because only eighteen
other bankruptcy courts have processed a prepackaged bankruptcy. 160
Even where the firm can select another experienced venue, Professor
Eisenberg and LoPucki's argument that there are no advantages to filing in
Delaware misses the mark. Speed is a crucial advantage in handling a pre-
packaged bankruptcy. While the mean time for Delaware is a bit quicker
155 See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 65, at 394-99.
156 This trend may be an example of herd behavior. Herd behavior occurs where a decision ration-
ally relies on the past actions of others rather than making its own independent calculus. See Abhijit
Baneijee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. EcON. 797 (1992).
157 Eisenberg and LoPucki are careful to note the limits on their empirical analysis. It is simply that
they have not been able to prove the hypothesis. Given the limited number of cases in the sample, it
would have taken a relatively large effect to have been statistically significant. See Eisenberg & Lo-
Pucki, supra note 8, at n.78.
158 See id. at 989.
159 See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 65.
160 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8, at 994.
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than for other jurisdictions, the median time is much quicker.' 6' While Lo-
Pucki and Eisenberg failed to find statistical significance for this quicker
median in the sample that they studied, a second study which included more
firms found that the quicker medians were statistically significant., 62 This
is an important distinction because, by definition, one half of the cases filed
in Delaware must have been resolved more quickly than the median case. If
the median in Delaware is statistically significantly shorter than that in
other jurisdictions, then filing in Delaware is a good defense against having
an unusually long bankruptcy proceeding. Faced with this choice, we are
not surprised that lawyers would advise their clients to choose Delaware.
From an efficiency perspective, there is a benefit from increased certainty
about the time it will take to resolve a bankruptcy case that should not be
jettisoned unless it were associated with a greater cost.]63
We have trouble identifying any such cost. Managers are unlikely to file
prepackaged bankruptcies in Delaware in an attempt to enrich themselves at
the expense of creditors. A majority of creditors must consent for a prepack-
aged bankruptcy to succeed. Creditors, as a group, are unlikely to agree to
being shortchanged. Moreover, in a prepackaged bankruptcy, debtors cannot
be filing in Delaware to obtain the benefit of "pro-debtor" case law. Pre-
packaged bankruptcies, by their nature, are not as contentious as traditional
Chapter 11 cases. Courts have not found issues of interpretation about which
to differ. Thus, debtors' preference for Delaware cannot be explained as an
attempt to obtain a more pro-debtor interpretation of the Code.'
64
Professors Eisenberg and LoPucki argue that Delaware's speed in re-
solving prepackaged bankruptcies prevents dissenting creditors from ob-
jecting to improperly obtained consents, and that this benefits debtors. 65
Their argument is rife with problems. First, as noted above, they have
claimed that Delaware is no faster than other jurisdictions in handling these
cases. Now they assert that the preference for Delaware is based on such an
advantage. They cannot have it both ways: Delaware is either faster than
other jurisdictions or it is not.
Second, Professors Eisenberg and LoPucki overstate the likelihood that
creditors will dissent in prepackaged bankruptcies. Under the Code, a class
of creditors must consist of substantially similar claims. These creditors
161 See id. at 989.
162 See Carapeto, supra note 69, at 24-25.
163 It is unclear the extent to which Delaware will maintain this advantage in the future. Inevitably,
other forums will have the chance to handle prepackaged bankruptcies. Given this, it is possible for
other forums to develop reputations similar to Delaware. In such a situation, a lawyer's advice may well
be to file in the more convenient forum.
164 This state of affairs differs significantly from that existing when the Southern District of New
York was the venue of choice in Chapter 11 cases. In that situation, it was easy to identify a practice of
the local courts-the routine continuation of the exclusivity period-that provided the debtor with an
advantage over its creditors.
165 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 8, at 995.
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tend to have similar preferences-maximizing the recovery on their
claims. 166 While the potential gains from holdout can induce small credi-
tors to act strategically, the Code is designed to prevent this type of behav-
ior. Indeed, Professors Eisenberg and LoPucki fail to identify a single case
where creditors were hoodwinked by a prepackaged plan.
In summary, the Delaware court specializes in handling a relatively in-
frequent type of bankruptcy proceeding, which is, when appropriate, ad-
vantageous to both firms and their creditors. 167  The Bankruptcy
Commission's proposal would disable Delaware (or any other court) from
specializing in prepackaged bankruptcies, and thereby make prepackaged
bankruptcies a more uncertain proposition. This increases the risks associ-
ated with filing these cases 168 and decreases social welfare. We believe that
this portion of the Commission's proposal should be rejected.
The Commission recommended venue reform because of the current
system's claimed inconvenience to small creditors. Even if this is true in
traditional Chapter 11 cases (an issue discussed below), it has almost no
relevance in prepackaged cases. 169 Less litigation takes place in a prepack-
aged case than in a normal Chapter 1 1 proceeding. Indeed, the advantages
which a prepackaged plan offer a debtor make it unattractive for that debtor
to file a plan which it believes would be contentious. For example, if a pre-
packaged plan provided a creditor with a legitimate complaint about the
amount of its claim, or how it was classified, that creditor could delay con-
firmation of the plan while it litigated its complaint. Managers contem-
plating a quick trip through Chapter 11 via a prepackaged bankruptcy
therefore try hard not to provide creditors with individual objections. Given
this reality, small creditors rarely need to appear in bankruptcy court over
contested matters in prepackaged bankruptcies.
166 See Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, supra note 5, at 1807.
167 It has often been stated that the Delaware Chancery Court creates similar benefits for firms and
shareholders because of its advantage in deciding important corporate law cases. One leading com-
mentator has summarized this argument as follows:
In Delaware, corporate law cases are heard in the chancery court rather than in courts of
general jurisdiction as in other states. The court's small size and continuity in membership facili-
tate the development of'judicial expertise in business law and enhance the predictability of corpo-
rate law decisions. Judges are appointed to twelve-year terms by the governor, from a list
submitted by a judicial advisory council, with the consent of the senate, and they often have a
background in business law.
ROMANO, supra note 37, at 39-40.
168 Indeed, after the Delaware District Court withdrew the reference, attomeys were hesitant to file a
Chapter II petition in Delaware. See Delaware Bankruptcy Judge, supra note 116, at A8; William B. Sul-
livan, Shaking the Jurisdictional System; Will Revocation of Automatic Reference Become the Norm?, 14
BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (March 1997) ("No responsible debtor's counsel would want his client's Chapter II
case to serve as a learning experience or training vehicle for a Delaware district judge.").
169 Unfortunately, the Commission's Report did not consider prepackaged bankruptcies separately
from traditional Chapter 11 cases.
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B. Criticisms of Delaware s Role in Traditional Chapter 11 Filings
Having demonstrated that prepackaged bankruptcies are efficiency-
enhancing, and that the Delaware bankruptcy court appears to handle them
efficiently, we next analyze the criticisms of current venue rules and the
Delaware court's handling of traditional Chapter 11 cases. As we discussed
above, Delaware became the venue of choice for traditional Chapter 11 pro-
ceedings in the 1990s. Traditional Chapter 11 cases have been the pre-
dominant part of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court's docket: in 1996, of the
twenty-six publicly traded companies that filed for bankruptcy in Delaware,
the majority were traditional Chapter 11 cases.170
Venue, as we noted above, is chosen by the firm's management in con-
sultation with their attorneys. Attorneys, all else being equal, prefer juris-
dictions that routinely approve fee requests as compared to those that pare
back such requests! I Managers prefer jurisdictions that give them an ad-
vantage in the negotiations with creditors, which are the hallmark of a tra-
ditional Chapter 11 proceeding.
Delaware offers these benefits to both debtors and their attorneys. 17
2
The Delaware Bankruptcy Court's unique practice of allowing the debtors'
counsel to inform a judge as to when they will file the case, and what first
day motions will be made, gives the debtor a strategic advantage over
creditors. For example, first day motions, which often include requests to
approve financing arrangements for the debtor while it remains in bank-
ruptcy, are often critical to the success of a reorganization. 7 1 In addition,
170 Although we cannot precisely breakout the numbers for prepackaged and Chapter I 1 filings, we
know that nationwide there were only nine prepackaged bankruptcies filed that year. See 1997 YEARBOOK,
supra note 48, at 149. By comparison, in 1996, the Southern District of New York, the former venue
champion, had only nine Chapter I 1 cases filed. See id. at 68. By 1997, the figure had declined even fur-
ther. See 1998 YEARBOOK, supra note 49, at 68 (explaining that 6 out of the 82 cases that year were filed in
the Southern District of New York).
171 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 31-33.
172 Skeel argues that the rise of Delaware may be an example of specialization-prepackaged cases
go to Delaware and traditional Chapter 11 cases go to the Southern District. See Skeel, supra note 25, at
39. While we agree with Skeel that Delaware has become the forum of choice for prepackaged bank-
ruptcies, and that this is a positive development, we disagree with the suggestion that firms are sorting
themselves out by types. We see no residual preference for the Southern District. Moreover, given that
the preference for the Southern District seems to have been driven by pro-debtor rulings, we are less
than sanguine about the conclusion that the use of the Southern District is a positive development.
173 Indeed, empirical studies have shown that approval of debtor-in-possession financing is posi-
tively correlated with a successful reorganization. See Carapeto, supra note 69; Sandeep Dahiya et al.,
The Dynamics of Debtor-in-Possession Financing: Bankruptcy Resolution and the Role of Prior Lenders
(March 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); Upinder S. Dhillon et al., Debtor-in-
Possession Financing and the Resolution of Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations (Working Paper,
1996); Fayez A. Elayan & Thomas 0. Meyer, Market Reaction to Announcements of Debtor-in-
Possession Financing: An Empirical Investigation of Bankruptcy Outcome, Duration and Loan Charac-
teristics (Working paper, January 1999).
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Delaware has developed a reputation as a debtor-friendly forum." Finally,
and most importantly for attorneys, the Delaware court has routinely ap-
proved their fee requests.' 75 All of these factors have contributed to Dela-
ware's success in becoming the new venue capital.
Of course, any jurisdiction that gives debtors and their attorneys sig-
nificant benefits in Chapter 11 proceedings will attract bankruptcy cases.
This analysis yields no direct policy prescriptions, other than our earlier
suggestion regarding prepackaged bankruptcies. Critics of the existing
system have complained that it encourages forum shopping practices and
therefore should be changed. Yet simply recognizing that forum shopping
exists does not, in and of itself, yield any policy prescriptions. Our legal
system generally tolerates a good deal of forum shopping. For instance,
plaintiffs in federal civil cases who sue corporate defendants can choose to
file in any jurisdiction in which they can get personal jurisdiction over the
corporation. 176  While many, but not all, commentators condemn forum
shopping, little consensus exists about how to determine the "appropriate"
venues for filing litigation of any type.
177
We have doubts about the wisdom of some current practices that en-
courage debtors to file in certain jurisdictions. However, we believe that
these concerns are best addressed through changing existing substantive
laws, rather than tinkering with the venue procedures. For example, if some
bankruptcy courts are too quick to extend the debtor's time for exclusively
proposing a plan of reorganization, we would argue that amending the rele-
vant provision of the Bankruptcy Code to bar such practices is a better so-
lution than gerrymandering firms' ability to select some jurisdictions.
Similarly, if the problem is ex parte contacts between judges and attorneys
prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, appropriate legislation can forbid
that practice.'
Indeed, if legal reform efforts focus on fiddling with the venue rules,
rather than addressing these problems directly, they will create only poor
second-best solutions. No matter how legislators draft the venue statute,
some firms will be eligible to file bankruptcy proceedings in an offending
jurisdiction, and thereby benefit from the objectionable practice. Moreover,
these offensive acts will rarely occur in only a single venue. Many courts
outside of the Southern District of New York routinely extend the debtor's
174 See Ann Davis, Delaware Court's Actions in Marvel Case Viewed as Message to Corporate
Debtors, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1997, at B11 (Delaware bankruptcy court "had been criticized ... by
some judges and lawyers around the country for being overly sympathetic to companies operating under
Chapter 11 protection.").
175 See Skeel, supra note 25, at 21.
176 See 28 § U.S.C. 1391 (1994).
177 See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 313 n. 17 (1990);
Solimine, supra note 13, at 55-56.
178 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 45-51 (arguing that it is better to fix objectionable
practices directly rather than manipulating venue provisions).
1393
94:1357 (2000)
HeinOnline  -- 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1393 1999-2000
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
exclusivity period, and many courts outside of Delaware allow some ex parte
contacts between judges and lawyers. 79 We believe that it is better to elimi-
nate these problems entirely rather than to try to suppress them indirectly. 80
Critics of the current system have instead chosen to label the venue
rules as the source of the problem. For example, the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion recommended restricting firms' venue choices because it believed that
present law unduly burdens small creditors. At first blush, this claim seems
plausible. Unlike defendants in civil cases who can only be haled into a ju-
risdiction with which they have minimum contacts, t ' in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings there is no such limitation. Even trade creditors selling on credit
to a firm in California, who have no contact with Delaware whatsoever,
could find themselves in a bankruptcy proceeding in Delaware.
How can we determine if these theoretical concerns are of practical
consequence? One important question is how to weigh the interests of the
firm's different creditors. Publicly traded companies will have creditors lo-
cated all over the country. Our Califomia-based firm in the preceding para-
graph may have outstanding loans from a major New York bank. If we
want to measure which forum is most convenient to creditors-Delaware,
the Southern District of New York or the Southern District of California-
should we: weigh all creditors' interests equally?; distinguish among credi-
tors based on the dollar amount of their claims?; or differentiate among
creditors based on the likelihood of payment?
Even if we focus solely on small creditors, who are presumably more
heavily concentrated in the area where the firm's assets are located, what is
the cost to such creditors of having to press their claims in a more distant
forum? We suggest that, upon closer examination, the cost to such credi-
tors must be small. To understand this point, recall that all creditors face a
collective action problem in a bankruptcy proceeding. Each creditor holds
only a claim to a portion of the firm's assets, and each creditor will receive
only a fraction of the total benefits of participating in the reorganization.
The Bankruptcy Code's solution to this collective action problem is to place
the drafting of a large, publicly held company's reorganization plan in the
hands of creditors' committees. Each secured lender is placed in a class by
179 See MacLachlan, supra note 113, at AI0.
180 To our mind, the best justification for restricting venue would run along the following lines.
Debtors will always choose the forum that favors their interests. At the time of a bankruptcy petition,
the firm's managers are engaged in a battle with the creditors. In most situations, a ruling that benefits
the current managers hurts the creditors. Thus, any choice by definition would be exercised in a way
that benefited managers at the expense of creditors. Restricting venue to one single location-say,
where the principal's assets are located-would reduce such behavior. We do not press such as argument
because, as we show below, it is better to redirect the incentives of managers by making them precommit to
file in a particular venue, and thus create competition among bankruptcy courts to promote efficiency.
181 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1444 (1988).
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itself. The unsecured general creditors, including the small creditors, are rep-
resented by a committee consisting of the largest seven general unsecured
creditors.'8 2 These committees tend to be dominated by large creditors, i"3
and their expenses are paid out of the bankruptcy estate. 84 This unsecured
creditors' committee should safeguard the interest of the small, unsecured
creditors. Its objective is to maximize the value of all the unsecured claims,
which will further the interests of the smaller claimants as well as the larger
ones. In other words, the small, unsecured creditors to a large extent are
able to free ride on the efforts of the larger unsecured creditors.
If it is true that small creditors are not directly involved in negotiating
the plan of reorganization, what are their costs of participating in a Chapter
11 proceeding? We can think of only two relatively small costs, hardly
enough to merit the sweeping changes recommended by the Bankruptcy
Commission's report. The first cost is that a small creditor will need to re-
tain local counsel to file its claim. This is a small expense as filing these
claims is a ministerial act that does not consume an inordinate amount of
time. It does not require the creditor's principal attorney to travel to the
court where the case is filed. The magnitude of this cost thus does not vary
with the distance between the creditor and the bankruptcy forum. This cost
is a fixed cost, which must be paid any time that the creditor's attorney can-
not file a proof of claim herself in the selected forum.
The second cost that forum shopping imposes on small creditors arises
only for disputed claims. In that subset of all situations, the bankruptcy
court must value the claim.8" If the dispute can be resolved by the court on
the papers without oral argument, the small creditor should not incur any
additional costs. Where the small creditor's attorney must travel to the
bankruptcy court to argue the motion, however, the creditor will need to
pay its attorney's airfare. The creditor's largest expense, its attorney's time
investigating the dispute and litigating the issue, would remain the same.'
86
While there are no thorough empirical studies of the net increase of travel
costs that might arise from the bankruptcy venue provisions, we are hard
pressed to see how it could be so big that creditors would be routinely dis-
couraged from pressing their claims.
182 See 11 U.S.C. 1102(b) (1994). The bankruptcy judge has the discretion to expand the number of
creditors on the committees as she deems appropriate. For an insightful analysis as to how this discre-
tion should be used to facilitate reorganization, see Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition Building Through Bank-
ruptcy Creditors' Committees, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1547 (1996).
"' See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large. Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 155 (1990) (noting that large,
unsecured creditors control the committee process).
184 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994).
185 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1994).
186 Of course, an attorney's fee can increase if the attorney bills for travel time during which she
performs no work for the client. Our sense is that while such billing may in fact occur, it is by no means
universal, and those who actually do it tend not to publicize it.
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We thus conclude that the Bankruptcy Commission's proposal to
eliminate place of incorporation as an appropriate venue is harmful in the
case of firms seeking to file a prepackaged bankruptcy, and would provide
little if any benefit in the case of a traditional Chapter 11 proceeding. Thus,
Delaware should remain as an appropriate venue in reorganization cases,
even if its only relation to the debtor is that it is the state of incorporation.
C. The Efficiency Benefits of Reforming Current Venue Rules: Importing
the Race to the Top into Bankruptcy Law
If, however, we reexamine the corporate law race to the top arguments
in Part II, we find a much sounder basis for reforming current bankruptcy
venue rules. To briefly summarize these points, recall that the race to the
top analysts have made compelling arguments that allowing firms to select
their state of incorporation (or reincorporation) increases social welfare. 87
In the traditional Chapter 11 case, by contrast, the firm has an incentive to
select a forum that favors its interests over those of its creditors, which may
not increase economic efficiency.
188
What is the difference between these two decisions by the firm? Under
state corporate law, a firm selects its initial state of incorporation at the time
of its formation, when its future is usually rosy. If it should choose to rein-
corporate, this generally occurs to facilitate a particular transaction that can
be undertaken more cheaply under a different legal regime. 89 In neither
scenario is the firm experiencing financial or economic distress, and the
firm's managers expect to retain their jobs for the foreseeable future. 9 0
These managers have incentives to choose value-maximizing jurisdictions
for their (re)incorporation because they know they will need to persuade in-
vestors to make later investments in the firm, either by buying equity or by
lending money.
By contrast, when a bankruptcy petition is filed, the firm's future is
unclear-it is experiencing financial distress and possibly economic distress
as well. The managers' job tenure is insecure. 19 In this final period situa-
187 See supra Part II.
Its Finally, in prepackaged bankruptcies, there are good reasons to believe that the firm's selection
of venue may increase social welfare by decreasing the costs of the reorganization. See supra notes 136-
48 and accompanying text.
189 See ROMANO, supra note 37, at 32. Romano points out that these transactions usually take one
of three forms: a public offering of stock, a mergers and acquisitions program, and anti-takeover defen-
sive tactics. Under state corporate law, shareholders need to approve a corporation's decision to reincor-
porate in a different state.
190 Even if management is seeking to reincorporate to strengthen the corporation's anti-takeover de-
fenses, managers are likely to retain their jobs because they will only seek shareholder approval for the
reincorporation when the corporation has yet to be directly attacked. If they should wait until a hostile
bidder has appeared, they are unlikely to persuade shareholders to approve a defensive reincorporation.
191 The turnover rate for managers in Chapter It is quite high. See Stuart Gilson, Management
Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1989) (29% of senior managers remain over a
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tion, managers will seek to preserve their control of the firm despite the
costs to investors, even if they only are able to delay their own day of reck-
oning by a few months.
How does the difference in the timing of when managers select their
firm's state of incorporation and when they choose their bankruptcy venue
impact on economic efficiency and the appropriate choice of bankruptcy
venue rules? We argue that while letting a firm's managers select its state
of incorporation is value-maximizing for its owners, permitting managers to
select their bankruptcy venue once the firm is financially distressed creates
important inefficiencies in bankruptcy law because managers' interests di-
verge from the firm's interests as a whole. However, if we could instead
force managers to precommit to the firm's bankruptcy venue at the time
when the firm seeks capital in the financial markets prior to the arrival of
financial distress, then managers would have an incentive to select the
venue which promises to maximize the value of the firm as a whole.
We begin by reiterating an important lesson of our earlier discussion of
the Delaware Bankruptcy Court: forums matter, especially in the bankruptcy
context. Bankruptcy judges have substantial discretion in implementing the
Code. For example, they must approve post-petition financing 92 and all
transactions outside of the ordinary course of business, 93 they must decide
whether or not to lift the automatic stay so that a secured creditor can fore-
close on its collateral, 94 and they must determine whether or not to allow
creditors to propose plans of reorganization, 95 which can often include a liq-
uidation of the firm. 196 Not surprisingly, these judges exercise their discretion
differently: some will make prodebtor choices, while others may be more
procreditor. Under current law, managers will choose the bankruptcy venue
that is the most debtor friendly in order to maximize their own welfare.
Such a choice may not be in the firm's long-term interests. For solvent
companies, investors understand the costs of various legal regimes.1
9 7
four-year period beginning two years before filing); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corpo-
rate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 669, 723-37 (1993) (reporting similarly high turnover rate).
192 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1994).
193 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994).
194 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994).
195 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1994).
196 See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. L.J. 319, 322 (1991)
(liquidating plans of reorganization account for between 20% and 30% of all plans); Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 601-02 (1993) (approximately 25% of reorganization plans effectively liqui-
date the assets of the firm).
197 The contractarian school of corporate law is best known for the argument that the capital market is
effective in pricing charter terms. They argue that professional investors, whose job it is to price stocks, will
scrutinize the charter terms and be able to price them relatively effectively. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 2, at 15-22. We need not accept this strong a version of market valuation in order to make the
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When creditors decide to lend money to the debtor, they price the cost of
the operative legal regime. Creditors' ability to increase the cost of capital
to firms that promote the interests of managers over the interests of debt and
equity holders acts as a substantial constraint on managers' behavior.
The same rules apply in bankruptcy to determine the costs of a bank-
ruptcy regime. 98 Whenever a bankruptcy regime reduces a creditor's pay-
out, perhaps by shifting firm assets away from the creditor in the
bankruptcy proceeding itself, or by allowing managers to take unwarranted
gambles once the firm encounters financial distress, the creditor will de-
mand a larger payment at the time it lends money.' 99 While lenders may
not be able to price these increased costs for every provision in a lending
agreement, debtor opportunism will increase the costs of loan transactions
generally. Raising costs on creditors ultimately raises costs for debtors.
In the corporate law context, these potential costs are constrained by
the threat to the firm of increased capital costs if it picks a legal regime that
fails to maximize firm value. The firm will continue to operate in the future
and to raise funds after it makes the (re)incorporation decision. This is par-
ticularly true for firms about to make an initial public offering because they
will be immediately raising funds. Moreover, the managers making the in-
corporation decision expect to continue to hold their current jobs when
these effects are felt. Furthermore, these managers will normally either
hold stock or stock options in their company and thus have a direct financial
interest in obtaining the highest possible price for the company's shares.
Compare this to the situation facing a firm when it decides to file a
bankruptcy petition. The firm's immediate concern is its short-term sur-
vival. Managers face an immediate loss of their jobs. They seek the most
hospitable prodebtor forum to preserve their jobs. If this means extra costs
for creditors, they will increase their charges and the firm will ultimately
pay these costs.
But when will the firm pay these additional costs? When creditors
loan funds they will anticipate that, once the firm encounters financial dis-
tress, its management will opportunistically seek the bankruptcy forum
which provides the managers the greatest benefits. The creditors will price
this cost into their loans up-front. Thus, at the time that the managers are
making their decision about where to file, the firm has already paid the
price for their choice. This will be true for all firms that seek to borrow
capital in the financial markets.
proposition stated in the text. Any pricing of the terms will push toward the selection of the efficient mar-
ket. In other words, we do not have to assume perfect markets; we only have to assume some market.198 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Law Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 414
(1990); Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 5, at 55-59.
199 See Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 5, at 55-59. Rasmussen has argued that this pric-
ing occurs even when the insights of behavioral economics are incorporated into the analysis. See Ras-
mussen, supra note I, at 1687-1702.
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This creates a social welfare problem because each firm is paying in-
creased capital costs so that, if the firm files for bankruptcy, their managers
can make a value-decreasing decision. Creditors anticipate that managers
will act in their self-interest, and price their loans accordingly. When the
time for the bankruptcy decision arrives, managers act in their self-interest.
They pay no subsequent penalty if their selection deviates from the socially
optimal one.
Furthermore, not all firms will file for bankruptcy. However, creditors
price their loans anticipating that all managers will act opportunistically if
the firm files for bankruptcy. Thus, each firm pays the expected cost of
their managers' self-interested choice of venue, with the expected cost be-
ing higher than the actual cost for those firms who never file, and lower for
those firms which end up in bankruptcy. This results in a wealth transfer
from firms who pay extra for credit and do not file for bankruptcy to those
firms who actually do file for bankruptcy.
This problem can be eliminated if we force firms to make their venue
selection when they seek to raise funds in the credit market before they are
in financial distress. Firms should thus be allowed to commit, in advance of
financial distress, to filing in a certain jurisdiction when a bankruptcy peti-
tion is warranted. If our proposal were enacted, the debtor would have the
appropriate incentive to pick the bankruptcy jurisdiction which best maxi-
mizes finrn value.
Our argument rests on the same principles that apply to solvent corpo-
rations selecting their state of incorporation. In that situation, if we disre-
gard market constraints, economic theory tells us that managers will pick a
state of incorporation whose law maximizes their private interests, irrespec-
tive of its effect on the firm's creditors and shareholders. Introducing mar-
ket constraints into these markets reduces the divergence of manager and
investor interests. Firms compete for capital. If their managers pursue
policies promoting their own interests at the cost of suppliers of capital,
suppliers will raise their prices for providing the firm's capital. Managers
thus face a trade-off: choose a legal regime which entrenches them in
power, or select one that lowers the firm's cost of capital. The latter regime
will enrich managers by increasing the likelihood that the firm will succeed.
The more successful the firm, the more successful the managers.
The same story can be told about bankruptcy venue selection. If we
view bankruptcy venue selection without consideration of market con-
straints, managers will select that venue which maximizes their private
value at the time of insolvency by picking the most prodebtor jurisdiction
that is available so as to preserve their jobs. The firm will, however, pay
the higher cost for capital discussed above.
However, once we permit firms to precommit to a particular bank-
ruptcy venue, this situation changes. Firms can now guarantee their credi-
tors about where they will file any potential bankruptcy proceeding and
thereby assure creditors about what kind of treatment they will receive if the
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firm files for bankruptcy. Creditors could choose to price the firm's potential
bankruptcy in this jurisdiction and agree to such a term in exchange for a
lower interest rate. Alternatively, creditors could propose a different venue or
other arrangement. In either event, creditors would be more accurately as-
sessing the costs of lending to the firm and charge a more suitable rate.
This strategy will also reduce the divergence between the managers' in-
terests and the interests of the firm. Managers have an interest in obtaining
capital at the lowest cost so long as they believe at the time they are negoti-
ating for additional capital injections that obtaining more capital will preserve
the value of their jobs (and stock options) better than the alternative of filing
for bankruptcy. This will generally be true where management believes that
the additional capital will enable the firm to reverse its financial decline.
We hypothesize that it would generally be value maximizing for firms
and managers if, at any time that a firm seeks credit from the capital mar-
kets before insolvency, they would offer to commit to filing any future
bankruptcy proceeding in a procreditor jurisdiction in order to persuade
potential lenders to offer more favorable terms on their loans. However, we
need not define the exact moment when managers and creditors will believe
that they are better off striking such a deal. If such an option were avail-
able, the parties to the firm's debt contracts could decide when it was value
maximizing to exercise it.
Once firms are allowed to commit to the jurisdiction in which they
would file for bankruptcy, the flaw in the current venue proposals becomes
not that they are overly expansive, but rather that they are unduly restric-
tive. Bankruptcy courts differ on the ways in which they exercise their dis-
cretion. Under current law, a firm cannot select among all bankruptcy
courts. Thus, the most efficient court for that firm may not be an available
selection. In fact, under current law a firm may have only one venue
choice, which may offer a regime far from its optimal selection.
To remedy this situation, we would suggest that, for firms preselecting
the forum in which they would file at any time prior to insolvency, they be
allowed to designate any bankruptcy court in the country. This would
maximize the range of choices available to firms and their creditors for ne-
gotiating a value-maximizing choice for a bankruptcy forum. Thus, our
proposal would, at a minimum, allow firms to select the most efficient
bankruptcy court available.
This preselection will also create incentives for bankruptcy judges to
run more efficient courts. Many bankruptcy judges like to handle important
Chapter 11 cases because they generate a lot of attention and often raise
complex and interesting legal issues.00 Moreover, most of the other cases
200 See statement of Bankruptcy Judge Robert E. Ginsberg in Davis, supra note 23, at B8 ("Judges
clearly enjoy handling the mega-cases because all the theory comes together."); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 118 (1995) ("prestige is unquestionably an element of the judicial utility
function").
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that fill a bankruptcy judge's docket involve neither significant amounts of
money nor difficult legal issues. To the extent that bankruptcy judges pre-
fer to handle high profile cases with interesting legal issues, they will af-
firmatively desire handling the reorganization of large, publicly traded
companies. These claims are supported by some bankruptcy judges' com-
plaints that the problem with the rise of Delaware as the venue of choice is
that it deprives other judges of the opportunity to have their fair share of these
cases.201 Indeed, as we described earlier, the bankruptcy judges in the South-
ern District established a committee for the express purpose of advising the
judges how they could attract more Chapter 11 cases to their courts. 20 2
Under our proposal, bankruptcy judges would be free to compete for
Chapter 11 cases, albeit more subtly than states compete for revenues from
corporate charters. In the current regime, the way to attract large Chapter
11 cases is to gain a reputation as a prodebtor forum. If firms were to select
the forum prior to the onset of financial distress, however, there is reason to
think that they would choose the forum that maximizes firm value. Bank-
ruptcy judges would then have to compete for the desirable cases by han-
dling Chapter 11 cases in a manner that maximizes firm value and thereby
leads firms and creditors to prefer that forum. In other words, if we allow
firms to precommit to the venue in which they would file, this will create an
incentive for bankruptcy judges to interpret the Bankruptcy Code in a way
that best maximizes firm value. The race to the top in corporate law would
thus be replicated in bankruptcy law.
203
Our proposal raises a number of obvious questions. First, we need to
be clear about the mechanism that a firm would use to make the commit-
ment that we advocate. Second, we must ask if creditors would adjust their
behavior if firms did in fact commit to file for bankruptcy protection in a
value-maximizing venue. Finally, we look at whether a bankruptcy court
can commit to be consistent in its rulings over time. We address each
question in turn.
How are firms going to commit to filing for Chapter 11 in a specific
venue? Firms receive capital from a number of sources. Many firms have
long-term debt secured by real estate, short-term debt secured by personal
property, unsecured operating loans, short-term trade debt, employees who
are owed for their services, and shareholders. These parties all contribute
201 See sources cited supra note 197; see also NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REPORT, supra note 19, at
779 ("[c]ourt competition for cases could distort analysis of legal problems").
202 See Houston, supra note 60.
203 LoPucki and Whitford have also reached the conclusion that bankruptcy judges compete for
Chapter II cases. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 37-38. They believe such competition is
beneficial under current law because it promotes specialization. See id. at 40-41. They overlook, how-
ever, the fact that the managers' interests diverge from that of the owners of the firm at the time that the
bankruptcy petition is filed, and thus bankruptcy courts will cater to the former at the expense of the
latter. Our proposal solves this problem by forcing managers to make a decision at a time when their
interests are more aligned with the interests of the owners of the firm.
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capital to the firm and do so at varying times. What is needed is a mecha-
nism to ensure that all suppliers of capital are assured that the firm has
committed to a single venue choice. If a firm can promise one creditor that
it would file in one venue and a second creditor that it would file in another,
neither promise is credible.
The easiest way to allow the firm to commit to a particular venue is
through a provision in the firm's corporate charter specifying that in the
event of bankruptcy the firm will file in a particular jurisdiction. °4 The
firm will thus commit itself in a public document that is available to all
creditors who view such information as relevant.2" By placing the com-
mitment in a single place, the problem of multiple, inconsistent commit-
ments-and the lack of credibility that it implies-is eliminated.0 6
204 Both Schwartz and Rasmussen have endorsed the proposal that firms should choose, prior to the
onset of financial distress, the entire bankruptcy reorganization process from a menu of choices, but
have disagreed over whether this choice should be made in the corporate charter or in the individual
contracts between the firm and its creditors. Compare Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 5 (proposal
having choice in charter); Robert K. Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy at Home and Abroad, in
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRAct, supra note 7, at 311 (responding to Schwartz) with
Schwartz. Contract Theory Approach, supra note 5 (bankruptcy terms should be in individual contracts);
Schwartz, Contracting, supra note 5 (same); see also Adler, supra note 5 (arguing that extant bankruptcy
law should be replaced by a regime that enforces contractual priorities to a firm's assets).
However, our proposals in this article, while directed toward increasing the efficiency of the bank-
ruptcy law, are quite distinct from the earlier literature. Unlike the proposed bankruptcy law reforms
discussed above, our proposal could be implemented within the existing legal system with little or no
change to current legal rules. Such an incremental approach to law reform has the virtue of not requir-
ing wholesale legislative action and the attendant uncertainties that usually accompany such changes.
This increases the likelihood that our proposal will be legislatively enacted.
205 Our proposal could be implemented by changing current bankruptcy law to permit corporations
to include a forum selection provision in their charter that could only be amended by a majority vote of
the creditors both in number and by the amount of the claims they hold. This would slightly impinge on
existing state corporate law by restricting shareholders' right to amend the certificate. We believe that
this restriction would only have a very slight effect on shareholders, however, if it was implemented be-
fore the corporation was in financial distress.
206 Two related issues arise with respect to affiliated companies and mergers. First, we would treat af-
filiated companies as separate and distinct entities for bankruptcy venue purposes and allow them to have
distinct venue provisions from each other. This would mean that each would be required to file for bank-
ruptcy in the venue in which it had precommitted to do so. From an efficiency perspective, this would give
each entity an incentive to seek to maximize value through the appropriate selection of its bankruptcy venue
and avoid any collusive side deals by one firm in order to shift value from its affiliate's creditors.
Second, with respect to mergers, we also need to address the question of whether the surviving firm or
disappearing firm's venue selection provision governs. In the event of a conflict between the venue selec-
tion provisions of the two concerns, we would first look at the terms of the debt to see if such a change of
control constituted a default that would require a renegotiation of the terms of the loans. In this situation,
the creditors affected would be free to reject the assumption of their loans by the merged company. How-
ever, in the case where there was a conflict of venue provision, and the creditors had failed to bargain to
protect themselves in such a change of control situation, we would apply the venue provision of the com-
pany with a greater amount of outstanding debt. We would argue that this choice would be more likely to
maximize value for all debt-holders and minimize sham transactions designed to curtail creditors' rights.
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The firm, however, cannot be allowed unfettered change in its choice
of venue. Otherwise, the benefits from ex ante selection may well evapo-
rate. This is because managers would have an incentive to switch the char-
ter choice to a prodebtor jurisdiction as soon as a bankruptcy filing appears
to be a realistic possibility. Such opportunistic charter amendments have
long been a concern in corporate law generally.0 7 Indeed, the inability to
make credible commitments on R's score may be one reason we do not see
firms attempting to commit to a particular jurisdiction today."' To guard
against opportunism, such amendments should only be allowed if approved
by a majority of creditors, both in number and dollar amount, as well as the
firm's shareholders. Presumably, creditors will not sanction a change that
is designed to enrich management at the expense of these owners of the
firm. Indeed, as we explained above, it is just such a commitment to credi-
tor determination which underlies the Code's current rules for voting on re-
organization plans.20 9
A second objection to our proposal might be that even if firms could
make binding commitments, creditors will not be interested in bargaining
over these commitments when they extend credit. In the case of a finm en-
tering the capital markets for the first time, well before the onset of finan-
cial distress, it may be that few creditors would pay attention to the venue to
which the firm has committed.2 t0
207 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Forward: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLtuM. L. REv. 1395, 1399 (1989) ("The questions of contractual freedom in the initial charter and in
midstream ... are different and require separate examination."); Bebchuk, supra note 2; Coffee, supra
note 2, at 1674-76; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1442-44; Melvin Avon Eisenberg, The
Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1471-1515 (1989); Ronald J. Gilson, The Case
Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 775 (1982); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1549, 1573-85 (1989).
208 Other reasons may include an uncertainty over whether courts would enforce restrictions on access
to bankruptcy courts and the fact that the issue of bankruptcy venue has come to the fore relatively recently.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 146-47. Another possible solution to the problem that juris-
dictions may not be constant in their interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code would be for the firm to vest
control of the venue decision in the hands of the creditors. After the bankruptcy petition is filed, any
creditor would be allowed to file a motion to change venue. The bankruptcy judge would not rule on
this motion. Rather, the creditors would vote on the motion, with each creditor having a vote equal to
the value of its claim.
The problem with this proposal is that creditors may not always vote for the value-maximizing jurisdic-
tion. At the time a petition is filed, creditors are not a monolithic group. Secured creditors with adequate
security would often favor immediate liquidation of the firm. Unsecured creditors, on the other hand, espe-
cially in situations where most ofthe firm's assets have been pledged to senior creditors, may favor ajuris-
diction with a bias toward continuing the firm's operations in hopes for a turnaround. While creditors may
have, on average, better incentives than managers in this regard, the inevitable conflicts that arise during
financial distress make this proposal less attractive than contracting for venue via the corporate charter.
210 By contrast, many firms reincorporate because they intend to engage in some specific transac-
tion in the near future. In this situation, the consequences of choosing Delaware law instead of their
home state will be manifest in the near future.
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We offer three responses to this argument. The first is that good rea-
sons exist for the market to price these terms. While the probability of de-
fault may be small for many firms, bankruptcy is a common occurrence.
Rational investors know that a given percentage of firms fail, and they have
incentives to take this into account when they make their lending decisions,
especially if the firm is experiencing financial distress at the time of the ne-
gotiations. Indeed, even if the parties do not anticipate a bankruptcy filing
in the near future, potential creditors are likely to view a public commit-
ment that a firm would file in a jurisdiction known for its value-enhancing
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code as a positive signal that its managers
are not going to act opportunistically.
The second response is that, at some point, the possibility of financial
distress will become patent. In this situation, the firm may well have to
obtain additional credit. In this transaction, if a firm commits to filing for
bankruptcy in a value-maximizing jurisdiction, it will have a lower cost of
credit. Although we would allow firms to make its initial venue commit-
ment at any time up until the point of filing a bankruptcy petition, they have
an incentive to do so much earlier to gain a lower cost of credit ex ante.
Third, as a firm approaches insolvency and seeks more capital, credi-
tors will need to determine whether to negotiate for a more favorable forum,
or risk winding up in a prodebtor forum. In other words, creditors will need
to pay more attention to venue selection options as the risk of insolvency
grows. They will be very interested in bargaining with firms at this point, if
they have not earlier, to avoid prodebtor jurisdictions.
One final concern with our proposal that we need to address is that
bankruptcy courts may change their positions over time, decreasing the
value of earlier commitments. In other words, although a certain jurisdic-
tion may have procreditor bankruptcy judges at the time that the debtor ne-
gotiates for its selection, there is no assurance that judges will have the
same dispositions when it comes time for the firm to file.
At first glance, there appears to be ample justification for such con-
cerns. Bankruptcy judges do not have life tenure; rather, they serve for a
period of fourteen years, though reappointment is a possibility. 21' A pro-
creditor bankruptcy judge may thus be replaced by a prodebtor bankruptcy
judge. While the State of Delaware has credibly committed itself to corpo-
rate policies and courts that maximize shareholder wealth,21 2 the selection
211 See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (1994).
212 Delaware's commitment to retain a value-maxirnizing corporate law stems from a variety of
sources. First, its highly knowledgeable judges, corporate lawyers, and legislature are capable of making
changes in the law that are responsive to the changing needs of corporations. Second, Delaware's constitu-
tion requires a two-thirds vote by the legislature to change the corporate laws. Third, the most important
reason to believe that Delaware will make the necessary changes in its corporate law is its dependence on
charter fees. Approximately 17% of its tax revenue is from charter fees. See supra note 136 and accompa-
nying text. If Delaware fails to respond to changing corporate circumstances, it could lose a sizable portion
of its state revenue from corporations deciding to reincorporate in more value-maximizing states.
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process for bankruptcy judges may not contain similar mechanisms. For
example, bankruptcy judges are appointed by the United States court of ap-
peals for the governing circuit. 13 There is no apparent reason to believe
that these federal appellate court judges have committed to any particular
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. If there is no continuity in judicial
attitude, pre-committing to file bankruptcy proceedings in a particular juris-
diction may offer few benefits.
We believe that this concern with judicial commitment is easily as-
suaged. Initially, we note that, in many cases, creditors have little to worry
about. If the term of their loan is shorter than the remaining term of the
bankruptcy judges in the district, creditors need not fear a reversal in policy.
Indeed, the choice of jurisdiction matters most when the firm is close to fi-
nancial distress. For example, where Microsoft would file for bankruptcy
does not enter the calculations of those who contribute capital to that firm
today. By contrast, current lenders to Phillip Morris are probably well
aware of what would happen were Phillip Morris to file for bankruptcy.
Similarly, when a firm attempts a workout with its creditors because it is
having financial difficulties, it is much more important which jurisdiction
would administer the Chapter 11 case if the out-of-court restructuring fails
to ameliorate the firm's financial distress. Thus, long-term changes in the
nature of various venues may not loom large.
Another reason why this concern is not significant is that, under our
proposal, judicial regimes may remain constant for two reasons. One, as we
noted earlier, is that bankruptcy judges tend to prefer Chapter 11 cases.
This preference creates an incentive for a new bankruptcy judge not to de-
viate from the attitude of her predecessor in a way that favors the interests
of the firm's managers. A new judge's colleagues may well attempt to so-
cialize her to the governing attitude in the district so as to maintain consis-
tency within the district. Indeed, one of the recommendations by the panel
advising the bankruptcy judges in the Southern District of Texas was to be
more consistent in their handling of Chapter 11 cases.214
A second reason that a drift toward a debtor-friendly attitude may not
occur post selection is that our proposal may alter the selection process for
bankruptcy judges so that it will produce more judges who maximize firm
value. While the appointment power lies with the court of appeals, bank-
ruptcy attorneys can have a large influence on this process. To fill a va-
cancy on the bankruptcy bench, the court of appeals receives a
recommendation from the judicial council for the circuit, which has the re-
sponsibility for screening all applicants.215 In practice, screening is often
done by local bankruptcy practitioners. To the extent that the local bar had
an interest in ensuring that its bankruptcy courts interpreted the Bankruptcy
213 See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).
214 See Houston, supra note 60, at A8.
215 See Pub. L. 98-353, § 120(b) (1984).
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Code so as to maximize firm value, and thereby attract more lucrative fil-
ings to the district, the bar would have an interest in being involved in the
selection process. While it is always dangerous to predict the future course
of events, it may well be that a system that regards jurisdictions that handle
corporate reorganizations efficiently would generate judges committed to
such outcomes.
Support for this supposition comes from the experience in Delaware.
After Delaware had become the venue of choice, a new bankruptcy judge
was added to the court, increasing the total from one to two. Were a judge
appointed to this new position who differed significantly from the current
judge, this would have increased the uncertainty of filing in Delaware, and
thus made Delaware a less attractive alternative. In fact, the person who
was selected for the new position was a member of the Delaware bank-
ruptcy bar, and soon demonstrated that he would act consistently with his
colleague on the bench. This consistency between judges is one factor to
which attorneys point when explaining the attractiveness of Delaware.
While one should always hesitate before drawing conclusions from a sin-
gle event, the Delaware experience suggests that our hope that the local
bar will assist in producing efficiency-minded bankruptcy judges is not
farfetched.
A third solution to the problem of changes in the predilections of vari-
ous venues is to allow for changes to the corporate charter. When a juris-
diction which had been selected by the firm in its corporate charter becomes
less attractive from the creditors' standpoint, the firm could amend the
charter to choose a venue which is now the most desirable. To the extent
that the firm anticipates that it will have to enter the credit markets in the
future, it has an incentive to change its venue selection to a more appropri-
ate jurisdiction. As we discussed above, however, this ability to change the
selection has to be cabined so as to prevent opportunistic changes.
In the end, moving the choice of venue from after the onset of financial
distress to before the firm has to enter the credit markets may both lead to
firms selecting value-maximizing jurisdictions and, through court competi-
tion for Chapter 11 cases, to more value-maximizing interpretations and
implementations of the Bankruptcy Code.
CONCLUSION
Venue matters. Different courts reach different results when presented
with similar cases. Potential litigants are aware of this fact and act accord-
ingly to select the most receptive courtroom for their claims. This phe-
nomenon has fueled concern over forum shopping for generations.
Scholars have argued endlessly over whether this strategic behavior is a
good or bad thing without reaching consensus about anything, even over
how frequently the practice occurs.
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The bankruptcy area may be one area where, although forum shopping
is prevalent, we can agree on the appropriate response. The source of this
consensus is not that there are fewer differences in the way different bank-
ruptcy courts handle corporate reorganizations than elsewhere. In fact, the
contrary may be true. Indeed, it is the Delaware bankruptcy courts' han-
dling of these cases that has led to calls to eliminate the state of incorpora-
216tion as an appropriate venue.
Rather we believe that consensus can be generated about forum shop-
ping in corporate reorganizations because there are strong theoretical argu-
ments in favor of it. Our argument is that if we force companies to make
their choice of bankruptcy venue prior to the time that they seek capital in
financial markets, managers will have strong incentives to preselect a forum
that will maximize the value that they will receive from financial investors
for their interest in the firm. Thus, the available venues for bankruptcy,
rather than being contracted, should be expanded in order to maximize
managers' choices.
The time at which such venue should be selected, however, needs to be
changed. Managers now exercise their choice of venue at a time when their
interests diverge from those of the owners of the firm. If we force manag-
ers to make their venue choice early, then managers, counseled by their at-
torneys, will select the bankruptcy venue that best serves their interests at
that point in time. This will lead them to select the most efficient bank-
ruptcy forum in order to maximize their returns in the capital markets.
Such a rule will have beneficial effects on judges, too. The Bank-
ruptcy Code as it is now written imbues bankruptcy judges with substantial
discretion, and there is no reason to believe that such discretion will be re-
moved anytime soon. Instead, with our system, bankruptcy judges, who
want to handle corporate reorganization cases, will have an incentive to ex-
ercise their discretion by making their forums more efficient.
Finally, we believe that our proposal to allow more liberal bankruptcy
venue selections, so long as they are made at the firm's creditors' request
prior to financial distress, has the virtue of being analytically sound and yet
capable of implementation without radical legal reform. Economically-
grounded proposals have the virtue of conceptual purity and intellectual
rigor.21 7 Yet, critics of legal reform proposals based on economic insights
frequently claim that these policy recommendations propose a complete re-
jection of existing law and require wholesale departures from current prac-
216 We have argued that this suggestion is misguided. It overlooks the importance of prepackaged
bankruptcies. These bankruptcies provide efficiency gains for all involved, and Delaware is a natural
candidate for specializing in this area. To the extent that there are particular practices that should be
curtailed, they should be curtailed in all forums and not reduced through the indirect route of the venue
provisions.
217 See generally Baird, supra note 30, at 573 (comparing the premises of law and economics bank-
ruptcy scholars, whom Baird calls "proceduralists," with those of traditional bankruptcy scholars).
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tices.21 8 This is often true and creates formidable resistance to these pro-
posals' implementation by members of the practicing bar. Our proposal
provides an opportunity for incremental reform that will improve the effi-
ciency of the bankruptcy laws.
218 But see Adler, Accelerated Resolution, supra note 31; Adler, Re-Exandnation, supra note 3 1;
Hansen & Thomas, supra note 5.
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